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This dissertation addresses open questions in economics surrounding the industrial
organization and regulation of recreational cannabis markets. The first chapter empirically
studies how the impact of location restrictions on strategic cannabis retailers affects market
outcomes and resident welfare. The second chapter provides a different method to measure
the externality that cannabis retailers impose on heterogeneous residents and how it varies
with different land-use policies. The third chapter investigates the presence of consumer
demand response and inertia in vertical relationships among buyers and sellers in a new
market.
The first chapter studies the welfare impact of land-use regulations, such as location
restrictions for businesses, which generally involves a trade-off between market growth and
the harm on affected parties and is ultimately an empirical question. I study how location
restrictions near sensitive-use areas affect recreational cannabis retailers’ decisions in Wash-
ington State and their effects on residents, consumers, and taxation. Using property sales
data, I first show reduced-form evidence that cannabis retailers act as a disamenity when
close to homes and to their assigned schools. Then, I develop a structural model of consumer
demand and firm entry and location and estimate it on a comprehensive dataset of retail
sales and inventory transfers. The model incorporates the various market regulations as
vi
constraints on the firms’ strategic decisions. I use the estimated model to conduct counter-
factual land-use policies. Relaxing buffers around sensitive-use areas, like schools, from 1000
ft down to 100 ft benefits consumers and harms residents but, on net, results in welfare and
tax revenue improvements.
The second chapter is a more in-depth study of the other side of the coin, resident
disamenities of cannabis retailers, where I develop a discrete-choice, static model of housing
demand and supply, and estimate it with property sales and mortgage applicants data from
King County, Washington. By allowing for heterogeneous households, I can incorporate
the role of cannabis retailers as a potential (dis)amenity to households. I then compute
the welfare impact of various alternative location configurations for retailers that arise from
the counterfactual land use policies studied in Larsen (2020b). I find that resident surplus
decreases on average but that the valuation for cannabis retailers is heterogeneous, with
residents with children being the main demographic negatively affected.
Lastly, the third chapter studies the supply chain of the market to understand the
factors that make-or-break vertical relationships and how a market matures. The third pa-
per uses a rich dataset of inventory transfers for the Washington State recreational cannabis
industry to assemble a novel dataset of vertical relationships between producers and retailers
starting from the market’s inception. In the early stages of the market, I find substantial
structural state dependence within vertical relationships, suggesting firms are reluctant to
sever their existing business links due to poorly performing products and serves as a caution-
ary tale against making assumptions about firms when not in equilibrium. As the market
reaches an equilibrium, product performance becomes the leading factor for producer-retailer
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Chapter 1
Location Restrictions and Resident Externalities:
Evidence from the Washington State Recreational
Cannabis Industry
1.1 Introduction
Amenity provision and regulation are perennial topics of discussion in state and lo-
cal governments due to their highly polarizing nature. Disagreements in amenity provision
policies occur due to disagreements between consumers that perceive gains from access to an
amenity versus the potential localized impact that the amenity may impose on residents. In
order to satisfy very heterogeneous goals while providing desirable services such as providing
affordable housing or allowing Airbnb to operate 1, policymakers often enact zoning and
various other land-use regulations. These regulations in turn may affect firms, who make
strategic decisions when their environment changes, which may affect the degree of amenity
provision. Understanding how firms may react to regulations before enacting them is cru-
cial for devising sound policy and avoiding unintended consequences. At the same time,
oftentimes, jurisdictions that are influenced by private parties or public opinion may pursue
certain policies that are enacted in the name of a noble goal but with the implicit objective
to achieve a different goal, which raises the question on the optimal way to devise policy.
In this paper, I investigate these questions and study the impact of various land-use regula-
tions around sensitive-use areas and other restrictions on the recently legal Washington State
recreational cannabis industry and its effects on the welfare of consumers and residents, and
1For example, Airbnb is often banned in areas zoned for residential use.
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on tax revenues.
The cannabis industry is a canonical example of an amenity that a substantial per-
centage of the populace believes should be provided in some form 2, but many, even among
its supporters, are against having a cannabis firm in their neighborhoods 3 4. Cannabis
and its consumers, like other illicit drugs, have traditionally been associated by society and
popular culture with crime, marginalization, and poverty, and a large fraction of households
are against anything involving cannabis and its allegedly crime-inducing factors that may
alter their neighborhood character. To this end, Washington State’s referendum included
location restrictions that forbade cannabis firms from locating nearby sensitive-use areas
such as schools, public parks, child care centers, etc. In practice, the restrictions meant
that firms were heavily constrained regarding their location choices, which led to substantial
clustering. In a standard model of spatial competition, clustering may lead to intensified
price competition, which may attract more demand. Whereas the main goals of the regu-
lators and referendum drafters were to maximize tax revenues while minimizing cannabis
consumption and reducing exposure of cannabis to minors, the actual effect may have been
more about protecting property values for residents and encouraging consumption through
lower prices and an easy consumer experience 5. The natural questions that arise from this
setting are whether these regulations had the intended goals, what the welfare impact of
relaxing location restrictions would be, and how each interested party is impacted.
In this paper I answer these questions in a twofold manner. First, I show reduced-
form evidence that cannabis dispensaries act as a disamenity when they locate near homes
2Pew Research Center, about two thirds were in favor of some form of legalization in 2019,
https://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2019/11/14/americans-support-marijuana-legalization/
3Roughly 70 percent of parents do not want cannabis dispensaries near their schools
https://www.studyfinds.org/kids-cannabis-majority-of-parents-say-dispensaries-should-not-be-near-schools/
4Roughly 41 percent of survey respondents would feel negatively affected if a cannabis retailer entered in
their neighborhood https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2015/04/14/in-debate-over-legalizing-marijuana-
disagreement-over-drugs-dangers/.
5Relative to the black market, which traditionally involved finding suppliers through word-of-mouth.
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and near schools, the main sensitive-use area of interest. I also show reduced-form evidence
of intensified price competition when firms locate closer to each other, partly due to the
stringent location restrictions. Motivated by these empirical findings and to formalize the
endogenous response of location restrictions on market outcomes and welfare, I develop a
structural model of consumer demand and firm entry and location. The model takes the
location restrictions as constraints on where firms may locate their businesses, which affects
their profitability due to being potentially farther away from consumers and more clustered
together with other firms. I estimate the model using comprehensive data covering the entire
supply chain of the industry. Finally, I conduct counterfactual land-use policies that relax
the location restrictions around sensitive-use areas, giving firms more options to locate but
also potentially being closer to sensitive areas.
The reduced-form analyses consist of two parts: the market and the residents. First,
I show that almost half of sales occur in firms that have a very geographically near com-
petitor, and that prices are lower relative to having a competitor farther away through
various distance specifications. Each month, new entrants update the distance to the closest
competitor, providing additional variation in price competition. Second, I use a lottery for
allocating licenses as plausibly exogenous variation to show that cannabis retailers locating
near homes and near homes’ assigned schools leads to lower property values for properties
sold once the market begins. While I find economically and statistically significant effects
for both channels, the effect is larger then retailers locate near a school, which is consistent
with the goals of the location restrictions.
In the model, firms first decide whether to apply for a license in a jurisdiction. Due
to license caps, they are not guaranteed to obtain a license if there are more applicants
than licenses. Firms that obtain a license, knowing about the consumer demand, play a
sequential location decision game by choosing locations among the available areas left after
the location restrictions and existing zoning regulations. Upon deciding upon locations,
3
firms set prices. Finally, consumers choose between nearby stores and purchase a product in
the framework of a nested-logit model with travel costs. Demand parameters are estimated
following the generalized method of moments estimator outlined in Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes (1995), location-specific fixed costs from the location decision game are estimated via
method of simulated moments, and the sunk costs from the application game are estimated
via maximum likelihood. The estimation procedure involves computing variable profits for
firms in each jurisdiction for all possible location configurations, which provides the payoffs
for all the nodes in the sequential location decision game. To ensure the estimation is
computationally feasible, I divide large jurisdictions into location sets, ensuring that no
strategic geographical area for firms contains more than 3 firms and 20 locations 6. In the
application stage, firms apply if expected profits are non-negative: note that profits are in
expectation since they are not guaranteed to receive a license in the case of binding license
constraints. Because of this wrinkle, sunk costs are estimated even for those firms that do
not obtain a license, and thus more closely resemble the opportunity cost of entering the
market rather than licensed firms’ operating fixed costs.
I find that relaxing location restrictions around sensitive-use areas down to 100 feet
increases consumer surplus by 80 percent in the entire state and by 57 percent in King
County, increases quantity sold and subsequently, firm profits by 87 percent and 52 percent,
increases sales tax revenue from the market, exacerbates homeowners’ negative externality
by 8 percent in King County, and reduces property tax revenue, but on net, there are resident
and tax revenue improvements relative to the baseline policy. On the resident side, residents
perceive a net surplus due to a combination of factors: in King County, stores locate in
denser areas, reaching more consumers at a lower travel cost, which increases consumer
surplus. Consumers appear to be sensitive to travel costs while being fairly price inelastic,
6I allow some location sets to contain more than 3 firms and allow other sets to contain more than 20
locations, but not both.
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so any increase in prices from firms locating farther from each other and exercising market
power is not felt as strongly as if firms were farther away from consumers. Homeowners are
more negatively impacted but not by enough to offset the gains that consumers perceive due
to the additional number of available houses between 1000 ft and 100 ft, and the prices in
these affected areas. Also, some new sets of properties are impacted due to stores locating
close to their assigned schools, but old sets of properties end up not being affected through
that channel due to firms changing locations. License caps in binding jurisdictions help
mitigate the externality that would be imposed on residents through limiting the number of
stores that can enter the market and be near schools. While more properties are impacted
than in the baseline, the additional number does not translate to losses larger than the
consumer surplus increase. Because sales and property taxes closely track firm profits and
property values, respectively, the qualitative pattern for resident surplus is replicated for tax
revenue collection.
My findings indicate that, depending on the social planner’s objectives, state and
local governments can allow less stringent location restrictions for businesses than what are
currently imposed without facing a net welfare or tax revenue loss. The implications from
this paper not only apply to states that have already designed their cannabis markets or are
in the process of doing so, but to any policy that may have localized impacts and employs
land-use regulations to mitigate potential negative externalities.
1.2 Related Literature
By exploring the welfare impact of land-use regulations for the Washington State
cannabis industry, I make several contributions to the existing literature. First, I show
reduced-form causal evidence of cannabis retailers acting as disamenities when locating near
properties’ assigned schools and other sensitive-use areas. Second, I assemble geospatial
data to recreate the spatial constraints that firms face in this market. Third, I develop
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a tractable model appropriate for modeling firms’ decisions in the presence of license and
location constraints and estimate it with comprehensive data on the industry’s supply chain.
Lastly, I study the role of various regulations on the welfare of different types of agents
present in the market, using location as a novel dimension to study the regulation of sin
good markets.
1.2.1 Spatial Differentiation
I contribute to a long line of literature in spatial differentiation. While seminal papers
like Hotelling (1929) used the idea of distance as an analogy to explain competition between
firms along a horizontal beach, recent papers such as Davis (2006) and Holmes (2011) have
exploited the actual spatial nature of demand to better incorporate how distance affects con-
sumption and substitution patterns. I follow these papers in adding distance as a disutility
term in consumers’ utility function. I also follow a slightly different literature in empirical
industrial organization that incorporates firms’ location decisions as a strategic variable,
starting with Seim (2006) who studied video-rental stores, and later refining the role of spa-
tial differentiation in papers such as Zhu and Singh (2009), Datta and Sudhir (2012), and
Orhun (2012). Whereas Datta and Sudhir (2012) examines the role of zoning restrictions on
product-type stores, I examine the role of a different type of restriction in spatial differenti-
ation on different market outcomes, namely welfare measures for consumers, residents, and
tax revenues. A common limitation in most papers that study location decisions is the lack
of detailed demand-side data, which I am able to exploit thanks to comprehensive data on
my industry’s entire supply chain.
Other relevant strands of this literature study spatial competition and its role on
preemptive entry such as Zheng (2020), the costs of zoning regulation for convenience stores
in Nishida (2014), and efficient firm location configurations in the restaurant industry in
Sedov (2020). In my setting, license restrictions make concerns about preemptive entry
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relatively unimportant due to the fact that firms can apply for a modest sum and if the
license cap binds, the licenses are allocated via lottery. This means that the market is
regulated in a way that there is no way firms can enter before others and thus preempt
entry of rivals. However, being the first firm to locate in a desirable location may lead
other licensed firms to potentially change their locations, which may suggest the presence
of a first-mover advantage. In addition, restrictions on where firms can locate may lead
to suboptimal entry from an efficiency standpoint. Regarding policy evaluation, I measure
both a variety of benefits and costs from relaxing land-use regulations for a given market,
as well as modeling firms’ entry and location decisions while ensuring the model remains
computationally feasible.
1.2.2 Models of Firm Entry
I also contribute to the industrial organization literature on models of firm entry. My
entry model incorporates license caps when firms are considering whether or not to apply for
the market in a given jurisdiction, and if we let the number of licenses go to infinity, the model
collapses to the classic Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) entry model. The most similar paper
to my firm entry modeling is Schaumans and Verboven (2008), where they model pharmacy
entry decisions under entry restrictions. I follow their steps in endogenously modeling the
outcome of whether a cap is binding or nonbinding. Whereas they are concerned about the
impact of the license restriction on welfare, I am more concerned about the impact of the
location restrictions, and the license restrictions in my setting are just another institutional
feature that I account for. A point of distinction between my model and Thomas (2019) is
that she models this market’s firms’ entry decisions by ex post dividing jurisdictions into
binding and nonbinding groups and obtains set identification of the fixed costs via a moment
inequality method, whereas I allow the binding/nonbinding outcome to be an endogenous
result of firms playing the entry game and estimate the point identified sunk costs for all
7
applicants, even those that do not obtain a license, via maximum likelihood.
1.2.3 Regulation of Sin Goods
Another major strand of literature I contribute to is on regulation of so-called sin
goods. Due to data availability and legal reasons, the bulk of the literature has focused on
alcohol and tobacco. Similar papers about alcohol markets like Seim and Waldfogel (2013)
and Miravete, Seim and Thurk (2018) study questions of efficiency, such as should a state
control all liquor stores, and taxation, like are taxes too high or too low and the heterogeneous
impact on consumers, respectively. This project tackles questions that arise when a state
allows the private sector to create a new market, under heavy regulations of entry, location,
and taxation. A more nascent literature on cannabis markets has spawned in the recent
years, with Thomas (2019) studying questions of allocative inefficiency, and Hollenbeck and
Uetake (2021) on questions of taxation. To my knowledge, this is the first paper to look at
how certain location restrictions that were aimed to protect the public, especially minors,
affect the market structure and in turn, affect welfare in a variety of ways.
1.2.4 Externalities
A third major strand relates to externalities. A cornerstone of economics, starting in
recent history of economic thought with John Stuart Mill and Henry Sidgwick 7, formalized
by Pigou (1921), who brought externalities into the mainstream, and conceptually refined
by Coase (1960) through the lens of legal disputes under transaction costs, who spurred an
entire literature in both economics and in law 8, deals with the deceptively simple idea that
an action that brings benefits to some may have potentially unexpected effects on others
who did not choose to engage in this action. The literature on externalities, both theoretical
and empirical, is vast. A few recent papers that measure various kinds of externalities like
7See Medema (2009).
8As well as myriad interpretations of “what Coase actually meant” (See Medema (2020)).
8
Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (2010) and Currie et al. (2015) measure the benefits of
agglomeration and the cost of living near coal plants, respectively, guide the methods in this
paper. I follow Currie et al. (2015) approach to measure the potential negative externality
residents perceive from having a cannabis retailer 1) near their home and 2) near their
assigned school by using changes in property values as a proxy for residents’ preferences.
1.2.5 Land-Use Regulation
One interesting and under-explored intersection of literatures is the one concerning
industrial organization and land-use regulation, as the decision of where to locate can be
crucial for businesses. This intersection is fairly sparse due to the manifold data limitations
and myriad regulations: zoning data is usually at the county level or at the city level, firms
may operate at a broader scope and we might need data from a specific industry, and it is not
clear if an industry is affected just by the regular zoning regulations or by additional policies
which may vary by the industry 9. Outside the intersection, work such as Turner, Haughwout
and van der Klaauw (2014) measure the welfare impact of land-use regulations by measuring
causal effects through cross-border changes in land development. Papers similar to the spirit
of this project are Ridley, Sloan and Song (2010), who show through a theoretical model and
survey data the potential anti-competitive effects of retail zoning and Suzuki (2013), who
shows that more stringent zoning regulations in Texas increases barriers to entry for hotels.
I contribute to the literature about land-use regulation and zoning by showing that making
land-use regulation more restrictive has significant impacts on market structure, which in
turn affects consumer welfare and taxation. One specific example of this contribution is
local governments imposing location restrictions around sensitive-use areas, which act as
an additional regulation on top of the usual zoning layers. Usually, those in charge of
9For example, cement plants will usually be located in areas zoned for industrial use, convenience stores
will usually be located in areas zoned for commercial use, and so on.
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drafting these regulations tend to ignore or minimize any potential market structure related
consequences.
1.2.6 Amenity Valuation
Lastly, I contribute to the long literature in urban economics of amenity valuation,
endogenous amenities, and land-use regulation. Some recent, similar papers like Black
(1999) use a boundary discontinuity research design to measure whether parents value bet-
ter schools. Bajari and Kahn (2005) use hedonic methods to estimate the value of cer-
tain (dis)amenities like climate or commuting. Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007) uses
a discrete-choice model to estimate residents’ valuation of schools and neighborhoods, and
Currie et al. (2015) uses a natural experiment and the ‘ring method’ to measure the dis-
amenity , through property values, of building a power plant close to properties. Thomas
and Tian (2019) apply Currie et al. (2015)’s method for my setting, and find that cannabis
retailers locating near properties has an economically significant negative effect on property
values. I expand their method by showing evidence of a second channel, that property val-
ues also decrease when a property’s assigned school, either elementary or high school, has a
cannabis retailer locate near it, and build a model around this result. A recent paper that is
similar in spirit is Almagro and Dominguez-Lino (2020), where they study the role of endoge-
nous amenities, in their case Airbnb, in shaping the location sorting decisions of residents.
They show heterogeneity in the valuation of having Airbnb near their residence, and apply
these mechanisms to questions related to zoning and price/quantity regulations in housing
markets. I study a similar phenomenon for an amenity that exhibits large heterogeneity
in its valuation among residents and examine the impact of its respective zoning/land-use
regulations on welfare outcomes.
The paper is structured as the following roadmap: Section 3 describes the neces-
sary institutional background of the Washington State cannabis industry and the relevant
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regulatory features. Section 4 describes the data used. Section 5 consists of reduced-form
analyses that show evidence of the impact of location restrictions on market structure and
externality mitigation. Section 6 describes the model. Section 7 explains the estimation
strategy. Section 8 goes over the results of the model’s estimation. Sections 9 and 10 explain
the counterfactual policy scenario and its results, and Section 11 concludes.
1.3 Institutional Background
As of 2020, cannabis remains a Schedule I drug at the federal level since President
Nixon signed the Controlled Substance Act in 1970, meaning that it has “no currently
accepted medical use and a high potential for abuse” (DEA, 2020). In 2013, the Department
of Justice issued a list of recommendations known as the ‘Cole memo’, outlining the possible
course of action that states could take to avoid federal crackdown in the event of state-level
cannabis legalization. Among these suggestions were policies such as not letting product
be diverted into illegal states, prevent cannabis consumption by minors, and prevent drug
money flow to cartels. As of today, recreational legal cannabis is a $9 billion industry and
generates almost $2 billion of tax revenue.
1.3.1 I-502 Referendum
In November 2012, Washington State residents voted in favor of Initiative 502 (I-
502), which allowed the production, sales, and taxation of recreational cannabis goods for
21+ adults. The referendum outlined the market structure, the supply chain regulations,
the kinds of advertising allowed, the license system and the location restrictions for firms,
among a few. The Washington State Liquor Control Board would take on the regulation
duties of the cannabis market and cities could impose additional regulations if their residents
desired.
The industry’s regulatory environment was inspired by the alcohol industry’s verti-
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cally disintegrated supply chain’s market structure, where producers for the most part can’t
sell directly to consumers 10. Firms could apply to become producers, processors, and/or
retailers. Producers grow the plant either indoors in greenhouses or outdoors. Processors
process the plant into the final product, which can range from placing the product into the
appropriate packaging, extracting the chemicals and placing it into vaporizer cartridges, or
preparing liquid or solid edible products. Retailers sell the products to consumers in com-
mercial stores. If a firm applied to be a producer or a processor, it could not apply to be a
retailer. Producers could also apply to be processors, and due to the ability to create their
own brand, the upstream of this market is highly vertically integrated. Firms that applied
for retailer licenses could potentially obtain up to 3 licenses statewide. This means that
there exist some chains. However, the chain business model is not yet very developed: the
existing chains, while being owned by the same person, are managed by different people and
obtain their inventory and form relationships with producers independently.
The referendum also implemented an excise tax. At the beginning, it mandated a
25% tax at each step of the supply chain but in mid-2015, it was changed to a 37% tax at
the point-of-sale level. Currently, Washington state has the highest excise tax on cannabis
out of all the legal states in the US 11.
10In virtually all states in the United States, liquor producers coordinate with distributors who transport
liquor to liquor stores. In theory, distributors are independent third-parties but recently, producers have
been able to use their own distribution companies and shut out smaller competitors from access to retailers
nationwide. See U.S. v. Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV and SABMiller plc. Up until 2016, Washington
state producers and retailers had to transport their own product from the grow facility to the retail stores.
After 2016, the regulator started issuing licenses for transporters, serving the same function as distributors
in the liquor industry but with more stringent tracking regulations.
11Hansen, Miller and Weber (2020) study the impact of this reform on the degree of vertical integration
at the upstream level and on taxation. Hollenbeck and Uetake (2021) study the optimal tax policy for this
market, finding that taxes are to the left of the Laffer curve and can thus admit higher taxes without losing
tax revenue.
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1.3.2 Background on Firms and Licenses
About 85 percent of producers are integrated with processors. Based on the propor-
tion of integrated producers/processors and the observed sorting patterns between producer
to processor, it is safe to say that the processor stage is mostly cosmetic and does not make
strategic decisions in this market. The firms that appear to make strategic decisions are
the producers, who must decide how much product to grow and where they will sell it, and
the retailers, who must decide who to buy the product from and sell it to consumers at a
reasonable markup. Washington State had between 600-700 producers during the 2015-2016
period, more than three times the number of retailers in July 2015, and this number swelled
to more than 1000 active producers by mid-2018. The main difference between producer
and retailer licenses is that the producer application license window was closed in December
2013 and, to my knowledge and unlike the retailer application window, was never reopened.
Thus, any firm that applied to be a producer before the application window closed and got
its application approved could enter, unlike retailers who are subject to a license cap.
1.3.3 Location Restrictions
I-502 forbade applicants from locating within 1000 feet from elementary, middle, or
high schools, playgrounds, libraries, child care centers, public parks, public transit centers,
or arcades. Figures 1 and 2 show maps of Seattle with the existing location restrictions at
1000 feet on the left-hand side, and a map of Seattle if those restrictions were to be lowered
to 100 feet. The purple areas are where cannabis firms could locate and the grey areas
are where they were barred from locating. Note that in the right-hand image, a significant
amount of nonallowed locations remains. This is due to the existing zoning regulations for
commercial enterprises 12.
12One could think of the right-hand map as all the locations where convenience stores such as 7/11’s could
locate, and the left-hand map represents the additional location restrictions for cannabis firms.
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When applying for a license, potential firms had to submit a proposed location that
complied with I-502’s location restrictions, as well as the existing zoning regulations for
commercial enterprises. The initiative also allowed jurisdictions to relax these requirements
if they desired. In practice, some jurisdictions relaxed some of these upon realizing that
there was no space for retailers to locate 13. Retailers report finding a location that complied
with the stringent location restrictions among the key difficulties when considering entering
the market. The other difficulty in finding a location was not being able to secure a lease
from retail spaces currently being paid through a mortgage given by a bank, since banks
refused or were unable to do business with cannabis firms due to the opaque nature of the
legality. In practice, firms secured retail space leases from private parties or built their own
retail stores from scratch 14.
Firms that applied to become producers and/or processors were not subject to any
license caps and were easily awarded a license if the paperwork was correct. Producers and
processors were also subject to location restrictions but since producers were mostly on rural
land and on private property, very few were affected by this constraint.
1.3.4 Dispersal Restrictions
Jurisdictions and residents were concerned about the potential impact of having a
retailer in a location on crime, neighborhood feel, and the kind of people that frequented the
area. Seattle, for example, did not want to create a cannabis-specific district so it mandated
that no more than two retailers would be allowed within 1000 feet of each other. In prac-
tice, this policy spread out the firms across the map but some firm clustering remained, in
sets of two, due to the significant location restrictions. Other jurisdictions’ existing zoning
regulations effectively designated certain urban districts as the only areas where commer-
13The case for relaxing location restrictions and up to what extent are discussed in detail in town hall
records from various local jurisdictions.
14I indirectly address firms’ inability of securing leases through banks when modeling location decisions.
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cial enterprises could locate, effectively opening the door to cannabis business districts, the
opposite effect of dispersal restrictions policies.
1.3.5 Licenses and Lottery
In this project I focus on the strategic decision of firms entering a market with license
and location restrictions. The state had restricted the number of available retailer licenses
in each jurisdictions based on a commissioned market study. Figure 3 shows the available
number of licenses in King County. The total number of available licenses in the state was
334, with the greatest number allowed for a jurisdiction was 21 for the city of Seattle. There
was also a cap on licenses for each county at large, which was meant for 1) firms that wanted
to locate in unincorporated parts of the county. If more firms applied for licenses than the
quota, the state would run a lottery and select the winners randomly. About 70% of the
applicants that received a license entered. If a firm that received a license was unable to enter
for some reason, the state would transfer this license to the next applicant on the lottery
results. Every Tuesday during the 30-day window of November 2013, the information of
potential firms that applied was uploaded to a spreadsheet on the WLCB website, so firms
considering applying knew about their potential competitors to some extent 15.
In early 2016, the state decided to merge the medical and recreational markets.
Some differences between the two markets stem from the fact that the medical market
was mostly unregulated: dispensaries could grow their own product, chemical testing was
not widespread, and product quality varied widely across dispensaries. Anybody with a
recreational license could apply and immediately obtain a medical license. The state also
increased the number of available licenses from 334 to 556 after a market study. Unlike the
first batch of licenses, this second batch was not subject to a lottery and was subject to the
15Potential participants knew this in theory. In practice, none of the industry participants I interviewed re-
ported knowing about this information when applying. Instead, they knew about other potential competitors
through word-of-mouth and due to previous experience in the medical market.
15
Figure 1.1: Available Licenses in King County
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WLCB’s discretion. Priority was given to applicants from the November 2013 application
period that did not obtain a license as well as existing medical dispensaries. This measure
led to several medical dispensaries closing without a clear course of action. The recreational
cannabis producers took on the duty of growing medical-grade products to sell to medically
licensed retailers.
1.3.6 Financing Issues
Due to the illegal status of the product at the federal level and given banks’ operation
across state lines, industry business owners were not able to obtain credit from banks to open
their businesses, and were not able to secure retail space that was being paid off by a mortgage
through a bank. The first point meant that potential firms had to obtain start-up costs by
themselves or through private lending. The second point meant that they could only open
up a shop in retail space that was either fully paid off and managed by private individuals,
or on undeveloped space, which would require to create a store from scratch and thus greater
than usual sunk costs. As the market matured, firms in Washington State were able to open
bank accounts in certain credit unions, but their access to financial services remains heavily
restricted.
1.4 Data
My main sources of data include cannabis retail sales, inventory transfers between
firms, laboratory sample potency results, and lottery license results from the Washington
Liquor and Cannabis Board, and property sales from the King County Tax Assessor. I
also use additional data sources to include information on consumer demographics, resident
demographics, and sensitive-use area locations.
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1.4.1 WLCB Traceability Data
The WLCB Traceability data consists of three main datasets: inventory transfers,
laboratory sample potency results, and retail scanner data. Inventory transfers consists of
inventory sent from producers to processors, processors to retailers, and producer/processors
to laboratories. The transfer data includes the date the inventory was sent, when it was
received, wholesale price, inventory type, inventory description, strain, and weight. The
transfers data can be linked to lab results data, which includes information on THC and
CBD potency of products. Lastly, there is retail-level scanner data, which features sales
date, sales price, weight, and product description. One of the unique features of the retail
scanner data is that it is a complete dataset of all sales for an entire market 16. These three
datasets can be linked by an inventory ID. There is a unique inventory ID for each ‘lot’, a
standard unit of production.
I aggregate products up to product categories and focus on the top 4 types which
account for 96.5% of sales: usables, inhalables, solid edibles, and liquid edibles. A product
is a product category-retailer-month. I compute the median and average THC and CBD
percentages of these aggregated products. Since usables vary by weight, I standardize them
to 1 gram units and compute the corresponding weighted average prices. The other products
are already at a unit-equivalent. Inhalables tend to be the priciest products both in terms
of sale and wholesale price, as well as chemical potency. Edibles have low potency and
their main variation is due to weight and flavors. Usables vary substantially in potency and
chemicals, mostly due to differences in strain types. In addition, for each product, I compute
the number of strains and number of products that the retailer offers. For example, a retailer
16The closest analogue is Miravete, Seim and Thurk (2018)’s Pennsylvania Liquor Control Board data on
store-level purchases. Another well-known analogue is the Nielsen scanner data, which includes all point-of-
sale records from a representative sample of stores across the nation. The trade-off between my data and
the Nielsen data is Nielsen collects more data but contains less identifying information about the stores and
the products.
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can offer 5 kinds of different strains and 15 different versions (brands, sizes (if loose), type
(preroll, flower, etc)) of usables in a given month.
1.4.2 Retailer license lottery results
The WLCB collected data on applicants for each jurisdiction: upon submitting an
application, they had to provide a proposed location. This location was not binding, but
if they received a license and wanted to locate elsewhere, they had to fill a form and pay
$75. In practice, the location restrictions greatly limited the number of possible places firms
could open an establishment, so about 50% of lottery winners located exactly where they
had applied and an additional 25% located within a third of a mile from their proposed
location. After the 30-day window closed, Washington State University conducted a lottery
for those jurisdictions where the license cap was binding. Applicants were given a number
and if the number was smaller than the allowed number (e.g a firm received the number
3 in a jurisdiction with a cap of 5), they were awarded a retailer license. Unlike retailers,
producers and processor licenses were freely awarded.
1.4.3 King County property sales data
I use property sales data from 2014 until 2017 to examine the role of retailer proximity
as a disamenity to residents. This sales data includes property characteristics such as the
number of bedrooms, bathrooms, square feet, a condition variable assigned by the County,
building type, and the zoning designation of the neighborhood.
1.4.4 Census data
I use data from the 2010 Census to incorporate information about consumers. I
assume consumers live in the population-weighted census tract centroid. For each census
tract centroid, I calculate the distance to the three nearest retailers. I also merge these
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centroids with demographic data from the 2014 American Community Survey. I calculate
the percentage of people over 21 years old and the population density of each census tract.
In addition, I use the Census data’s rich information on neighborhood characteristics
and the demographics of residents to complement the property sales data. This helps account
for potential heterogeneity in resident valuation: it may be the case that some residents
view having a retailer nearby as a significant disamenity, while others would welcome its
presence. I include demographic characteristics into the reduced-form hedonic analyses to
more accurately measure residents’ willingness to pay.
1.4.5 Zoning layers
In order to determine which locations are off-limits for retailers, I collect the zoning
layers from all counties in Washington state. I use the shapefiles from the Puget Sound
Mapping Project, which includes the entire zoning layers of Whatcom, Skagit, Snohomish,
King, San Juan, Clallam, Jefferson, Kitsap, Mason, Thurston, and Pierce counties. For those
jurisdictions that I was unable to obtain shapefiles, I collected zoning maps from each city’s
website and created the appropriate zoning shapefile in ArcMap. These shapefiles allow
me to drop all census tracts that are mostly in residential zoning and other areas where
commercial spaces are not allowed to locate. To determine which locations remain available
for retailers, I create buffers around sensitive-use areas and drop all census tracts that are
mostly covered by the buffers, leaving those with a substantial percentage of area available
for setting up a store.
1.4.6 Sensitive-use area locations
I collect the locations of all restricted entities included in the I-502 and create buffers
of 1000 and 100 feet around each location. These locations are crucial in order to assign
properties to nearby SUAs and to determine whether a location is feasible for the firm
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problem. The buffers show the ubiquity of the restriction. Figures 1 and 2 show the location
restrictions in Seattle suggested by the i-502 referendum, 1000 feet, and how the restrictions
would look like if they were reduced down to 100 feet. In the two figures, the pink areas are
available mixed-use/commercial zones where retail establishments can locate. The grey areas
that stay constant across the two figures are residential areas where no retail establishment
can locate. The grey areas that change as I change the buffer size are the areas in mixed-
use/commercial zones that become available for retailers.
Figure 1.2: Seattle with 1000 ft location
restrictions
Figure 1.3: Seattle with 100 ft location
restrictions
1.5 Reduced-Form Analysis
I present reduced-form evidence that 1) the location restrictions restricted the lo-
cations where retailers could locate, leading to intensified price competition and 2) using
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changes in property values as a proxy for residents’ preferences, retailers locating close to
homes and their assigned schools negatively affect property values.
1.5.1 Competitor Proximity on Prices
To motivate the claim that firms were affected by the location restrictions, Figure 4
shows a map of where firms have chosen to locate in Seattle. Firms locate very close to each
other, in a way that is reminiscent of gas stations. Table 1 provides summary statistics of
the proximity of stores, first by looking by retailers and second by sales. These summary
statistics show that a significant amount of economic activity in this market occurs through
firms that have a competitor very close by, potentially affecting price and product choices.
For example, first, we can observe that even though the percentage of retailers that have a
nearby competitor - which means within 1.5 km - is 40 percent, they account for 50 percent
of sales. Second, the table shows that 6.7 percent of retailers have a nearby competitor
within 100 meters, about the length of a standard city block.
Table 1.1: Summary Statistics: Distance to Nearest Competitor






I run regressions of retail price on competitor proximity to test the hypothesis that
having a nearby competitor leads to lower prices. I control for product characteristics such
as brand, weight, description, city, producer brand, strain, month, and inventory type. I
also change the distance measures of how close a firm is to a nearby competitor each month
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Figure 1.4: Retailers in Seattle, 2016
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as new firms enter the market. The goal is that the only variation left affecting prices is the
role of competitor proximity.
Table 2 shows that when we regress the distance to the closest competitor on logged
sales price, increasing the distance by 1 km is associated with 20.3 percent increases in sales
price. When I regress the distance to the closest competitor on the logged margin, increasing
the distance by 1 km is associated with 16 percent increased in the margin. The fact that
both effects are similar implies that most of the increase is due to retailer market power and
not due to the wholesale price. However, the main issue with this kind of analysis is that
the distance effect rapidly disappears as distance increases.
Table 1.2: Retailer Proximity on Price Competition, Continuous Distance
Log(Price) Log(Margin)
(1) (2)
Distance To Closest Competitor .203 .161
(.015)∗∗∗ (.006)∗∗∗




This table presents regression estimates of the effect that the distance of the closest com-
petitor, in kilometers, that each retailer has on retail prices and on margins, both logged.
Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
For more granular interpretation of the competitor proximity effects on price, Tables
3 and 4 show the effects if we break down the proximity in distance bins. I break down
distance into five discrete bins: within 100 meters, between 100 meters and 300 meters,
between 300 meters and 500 meters, between 500 meters and 1500 meters, and above 1500
meters. Table 3 shows the results when we use city as a fixed effect and Table 4 shows
the results when we use the 3-digit zipcode as a fixed effect. The city-level specification is
preferred since it accounts more realistically for the local competition features of the market,
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Table 1.3: Retailer Proximity on Price Competition, Distance Bins, City FE
Log(Price) Log(Margin)
(1) (2)
Within 0.1km -.050 .006
(.003)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Between 0.1km & 0.3km -.022 -.053
(.003)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Between 0.3km & 0.5km -.066 -.057
(.004)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Between 0.5km & 1.5km -.052 -.00008
(.003)∗∗∗ (.001)




This table presents regression estimates of the effect of competitor distance on retail prices
and margins, logged. I construct discrete distance bins around each retailer, and assign a 1
if a retailer has a competitor in each distance bin and 0 otherwise. I include city-level fixed
effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Table 1.4: Retailer Proximity on Price Competition, Distance Bins, Zip3 FE
Log(Price) Log(Margin)
(1) (2)
Within 0.1km -.067 .010
(.003)∗∗∗ (.0009)∗∗∗
Between 0.1km & 0.3km -.005 -.044
(.002)∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Between 0.3km & 0.5km -.043 -.040
(.003)∗∗∗ (.001)∗∗∗
Between 0.5km & 1.5km -.044 -.005
(.002)∗∗∗ (.0009)∗∗∗




This table presents regression estimates of the effect of competitor distance on retail prices
and margins, logged. I construct discrete distance bins around each retailer, and assign a 1
if a retailer has a competitor in each distance bin and 0 otherwise. I include Zip3-level fixed
effects. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
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but the patterns also hold when we use a 3-level zipcode fixed effect, which matches the
rural/urban divide of the market.
The regressions are of the form:
log(Pcit) = γMinDisti +Xcitβ + FE + εcit (1.1)
log(Pcit) = DistBiniγ +Xcitβ + FE + εcit (1.2)
where Pcit is either logged sales price or logged margin
17 of product c in retailer i in
month t, MinDisti is the distance in kilometers of a retailer i with its closest competitor,
DistBini is a collection of distance bins for retailer i, Xcit includes product-level THC and
CBD potency, weight, and retailer age in months. Fixed effects include producer brand,
product strain, month-year, product category, and retailer zipcode.
The minimum distance and distance bin specifications show negative impacts on price
at all distance bin levels, meaning that having a competitor within 1500 meters is associated
with having lower prices after we control for a variety of factors.
1.5.2 Externality on Residents
The location restrictions around sensitive-use areas for cannabis retailers were ar-
guably put in place to prevent minors from being exposed to cannabis near the places they
tend to congregate. To test whether the presence of cannabis establishments has a negative
impact on residents and their children, I use changes in property values for the homes that
sold during the period the market started as a proxy for residents’ preferences. I show that
property values of homes fall when retailers locate 1) close to a property and 2) close to
the property’s assigned elementary/high school. Retailers locating close to a property would
17I use the observed retail and wholesale prices to compute the margin P−MCP .
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occur regardless of the regulation in place short of banning the cannabis market, and it can
be inferred that the more important channel for regulation purposes is the one where firms
locate near sensitive-use areas. For homeowner associations, residents that view housing
as an investment and care about how urban amenities affect a neighborhood’s feel, and for
families with children, both channels may be important.
I follow a hedonic approach. First, I geocode all properties that were sold in King
County between August 2014 and January 2016. I match each property to its assigned
elementary/high school based on school proximity or based on school attendance zone. I
also include property and neighborhood characteristics from the property sales data, the
HMDA data, and from the ACS data at the census tract level. I match properties and their
assigned schools to their nearest retailer that entered the market. I create discrete ‘bins’
based on distance from the retailer to the house and from retailers to the schools: close,
medium, and far. The first bin includes all datapoints that are less than the 25 percentile
in the distance. The second bin includes datapoints between the 25 and 75 percentile in
distance. The third bin includes datapoints above the 75 percentile in distance. To control
for the potential endogeneity of retailers locating in locations with lower property values, I
include as a control variable the proximity of those applicants that did not get a license in
the lottery. Figure 5 shows a sketch of the exogenous variation that the lottery provides.
The proximity of a retailer to the home and to the home’s assigned school is considered a
(dis)amenity, which means I expect negative effects on property values. Table 5 displays
summary statistics of property prices and characteristics depending on their proximity to
lottery entrants and losers. Note that the sale prices for properties near entrants and near
losers and quantitatively similar, whereas they are markedly different than those properties
far from where potential firms applied. Table 6 displays the number of applicants and
entrants in both King County and statewide. Most firms that received a license in binding
jurisdictions entered their respective markets.
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Figure 1.5: Exogenous Variation Provided by the Lottery - Sketch
Table 1.5: Number of Applicants and Entrants
Entrants Winners Losers
King County 41 47 253
WA State 216 257 868
Table 1.6: Average Summary Statistics for Properties and Demographics
Variables All Properties Near Entrant Not Near Entrant Near Loser Not Near Loser
Sale Price ($) 579,857 459,881 605,485 481,838 613,167
Beds 3.29 3.23 3.31 3.16 3.34
Baths 1.536 1.52 1.54 1.52 1.54
Home Age 47 49.58 46.47 48.06 46.66
Sq ft 1912 1801 1936 1757 1965
Share White 70.0 68.0 70.3 75.9 68.04
≥HS Grad(%) 92.73 92.92 92.96 94.86 92.01
Med Income ($) 74,551 69,858 75,553 76,278 73966
i-502 Yes % 67.87 70.04 67.43 72.37 66.4
Observations 24,669 4342 20327 6238 18,431
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Hedonic regressions are of the form:
log(Pijt) = γ1NearWini+γ2NearLosei+α1DistRetSUAi+α2DistRetSUALosei+Xijtβ+FE+εijt
(1.3)
where NearWini is a dummy variable whether the property is near a retailer ap-
plicant winner, NearLosei is a dummy variable whether the property is near a retailer
applicant loser, DistRetSUAi are sets of two dummy variables (close, medium) for whether
the property’s assigned high school and elementary schools are near a retailer entrant,
DistRetSUALosei are sets of two dummy variables (close, medium) for whether the prop-
erty’s assigned high school and elementary schools are near a retailer applicant loser, Xijt
are property characteristics like number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, condition,
age, square feet, and neighborhood characteristics like census tract demographic data and
precinct-level i-502 referendum results. Fixed effects include quarter-year, property type,
zoning area type, and census tract.
I repeat this exercise for the other sensitive-use areas but I find mostly null results
potentially for two reasons: 1) families with children are likely the main negatively affected
demographic group 18 and 2) residents have a choice of which library/park/etc to go to,
but they are exogenously assigned to a specific school based on attendance boundaries. The
qualitative patterns are of the expected signs (e.g. being near parks has positive coefficients)
but the coefficients are not statistically or economically significant. I also repeat the exercise
for churches 19, which are not in the I-502 list but may have people that do not want a
18Conversations with real estate agents regarding residents’ preferences toward cannabis retailer proximity
to sensitive-use areas confirm the qualitative pattern of results.
19Residents in the Central District neighborhood in Seattle protested in 2016 against the opening of a
cannabis store next to a historic church that unofficially offered an afterschool program for the neighbor-
hood’s youth, even prompting a hip hop protest song: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=LSUaa rckaA,
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/marijuana/protesters-march-on-seattles-uncle-ikes-pot-shop/
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cannabis retailer next to their place of worship. I don not observe any results, probably
because it is likely that people do not go to their nearest church. Without better data, I am
unable to examine that matter further.
Table 7 shows the results from hedonic regressions of property characteristics and
amenities on logged property sales price. The first specification creates dummies for the
property being within 0.579 km from a retailer applicant loser, and being within 0.579 km
from a retailer applicant winner. The second specification increases that distance up to
0.704 km for both of these dummies. I also include two dummies for the property’s assigned
high school and elementary school: for both sensitive-use areas, there is one dummy variable
for whether the SUA is within 0.8 km of its nearest retailer, and one dummy variable for
whether the SUA is between 0.8 km and 1.6 km of its nearest retailer.
Both specifications display the same qualitative patterns. Being near a retailer win-
ner’s proposed location decreases property values by about 2-2.5 percent. Being near an
applicant loser’s proposed location has no impact on the property’s sale price. A property’s
assigned high school being within 0.8 km of a retailer winner has a negative coefficient (a
decrease of about 2.8 percent) but is statistically insignificant. A property’s assigned high
school being between 0.8 km and 1.6 km of a retailer winner leads to a decrease of about
4.5 percent. A property’s assigned elementary school being between 0.8 km and 1.6 km of a
retailer winner leads to a decrease of about 3.7 percent. A property’s assigned elementary
school being between 0.8 km and 1.6 km of a retailer winner leads to a decrease of about 4.6
percent.
In Tables 8 and 9, I run specifications for 1 bin for properties and for schools, and
for 2 bins for properties and 2 bins for schools, and find similar results. This battery of
specifications suggests that there are two channels by which cannabis retailers negatively
affect residents: first, through proximity to residents’ homes and second, through proximity
to residents’ assigned schools.
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Table 1.7: Effect of Retailer Entry on Property Values - 1 bin each
log(Price) Log(Price)
(1) (2)
[γ1]: Home Near Retailer Winner -.022 -.028
(.011)∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗
[γ2]: Home Near Retailer Loser -.008 .005
(.009) (.009)
[α1]: Retailer Winner Near HS -.042 -.041
(.016)∗∗ (.016)∗∗
[α2]: Retailer Winner Near ES -.049 -.049
(.017)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗
Retailer Near ES Loser -.015 -.016
(.014) (.014)




Column 1 defines ’Home Near Retailer Loser’ and ’Home Near Retailer Winner’ equal to 1 if
the property is within 1900 ft (0.58 km) of retailer applicant losers and winners, respectively.
Column 2 defines ’Home Near Retailer Loser’ and ’Home Near Retailer Winner’ equal
to 1 if the property is within 2300 ft (0.70 km) of retailer applicant losers and winners,
respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Fixed effects: month-year, census tract, zipcode, zoning.
Xij: property characteristics, precinct-level i-502 referendum results, elementary school
quality, near lottery loser address for schools.
∗ ∗ ∗: significant at 1% level. ∗∗: significant at 5% level.
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Table 1.8: Effect of Retailer Entry on Property Values -1 bin homes, 2 bins schools
Log(Price) Log(Price)
(1) (2)
[γ1]: Home Near Retailer Winner -.021 -.025
(.010)∗∗ (.010)∗∗∗
[γ2]: Home Near Retailer Loser -.008 .005
(.009) (.009)
[α11]: Retailer Near HS 1st Bin -.028 -.027
(.020) (.020)
[α12]: Retailer Near HS 2nd Bin -.045 -.044
(.017)∗∗∗ (.017)∗∗∗
[α21]: Retailer Near ES 1st Bin -.037 -.036
(.018)∗∗ (.018)∗∗




Column 1 defines ’Home Near Retailer Loser’ and ’Home Near Retailer Winner’ equal to 1 if
the property is within 1900 ft (0.58 km) of retailer applicant losers and winners, respectively.
Column 2 defines ’Home Near Retailer Loser’ and ’Home Near Retailer Winner’ equal
to 1 if the property is within 2300 ft (0.70 km) of retailer applicant losers and winners,
respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Fixed effects: month-year, census tract, zipcode, zoning.
Xij: property characteristics, precinct-level i-502 referendum results, elementary school
quality, near lottery loser address for schools.
∗ ∗ ∗: significant at 1% level. ∗∗: significant at 5% level.
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Table 1.9: Effect of Retailer Entry on Property Values - 2 bins each
log(Price)
[γ11]: Home Near Retailer Winner 1st Bin -.053
(.013)∗∗∗
[γ12]: Home Near Retailer Winner 2nd Bin -.017
(.012)
[γ2]: Home Near Retailer Loser .004
(.009)
[α11]: Retailer Near HS 1st Bin -.025
(.021)
[α12]: Retailer Near HS 2nd Bin -.043
(.017)∗∗
[α21]: Retailer Near ES 1st Bin -.046
(.019)∗∗
[α22]:Retailer Near ES 2nd Bin -.048
(.017)∗∗∗
Retailer Near ES Loser -.015
(.014)




Column 1 defines ’Home Near Retailer Loser’ and ’Home Near Retailer Winner’ equal to 1 if
the property is within 1900 ft (0.58 km) of retailer applicant losers and winners, respectively.
Column 2 defines ’Home Near Retailer Loser’ and ’Home Near Retailer Winner’ equal
to 1 if the property is within 2300 ft (0.70 km) of retailer applicant losers and winners,
respectively. Robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Fixed effects: month-year, census tract, zipcode, zoning.
Xij: property characteristics, precinct-level i-502 referendum results, elementary school
quality, near lottery loser address for schools.
∗ ∗ ∗: significant at 1% level. ∗∗: significant at 5% level.
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1.5.2.1 Interpreting Hedonic Coefficients
A drop in property values of 2.5% when a retailer opens near a property is econom-
ically significant. The average home in King County, WA during the data’s time period is
$579,857, so a drop of 2.5% would be equivalent to $14,496 that is lost compared to similar
properties that did not have a retailer locate nearby. A drop in property values of 4.5%
when a retailer opens near a property’s assigned school is also economically significant, of
about $26,093. While these losses arguably can be offset by rapid appreciation as witnessed
in the Seattle metro area in the last decade, the urban economics literature has extensively
documented how certain initial policies in an urban area can lead to more similar measures
that reinforce the initial policy’s effect 20, either leading to more positive or more negative
effects in the long-term. One may worry that the presence of cannabis stores in one neigh-
borhood may lead to more urban disamenities, thus depressing the neighborhood for the
medium-to-long-term future.
The reduced-form analyses on retailer price competition and on property prices serve
as motivating evidence that the imposed location restrictions affect the cannabis market
structure and, without banning the market, are able to mitigate the market’s externality on
residents. I use these pieces of evidence as building blocks for a structural model that en-
dogenizes firms’ decisions of entry and location, using the existing regulations as constraints
on firms’ choices.
1.6 Model
I develop a structural model of consumer demand and firm entry and location to study
the welfare impact of location restrictions around sensitive-use areas for cannabis retailers.
I incorporate the license and location restrictions as constraints on firms’ decision making.
20See Shertzer, Twinam and Walsh (2018).
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For computational feasibility reasons, I divide the larger jurisdictions into disjoint
location sets, which restrict where in a jurisdiction firms can choose to locate 21. Firms choose
to locate in census tracts l, which compose location sets Ajm, which compose jurisdictions
m.
Census tracts l ∈ L ⊆ Location Sets Ajm ∈ ∪|M |j=1Ajm ⊆ Jurisdictions m ∈M
To make the model computationally feasible to estimate, firms in a location set only
consider the game they play with the other competitors in that location set, and assume
that firms in other location sets locate in the population-weighted location set centroid.
Conceptually, this behavioral assumption is analogous to an oblivious equilibrium, where
firms in one market know the number of firms in another market but do not keep track of
everybody’s state variables. This can also help reflect the fact that applicants were local
businesspeople and had a preference for certain neighborhoods.
1.6.0.1 Creating Location Sets
The goal is to create as few location sets as possible 22 while maintaining the esti-
mation computationally feasible. The criterion used is as follows: if a jurisdiction had up
to 3 available licenses or up to 20 census tracts, I consider it one location set. Otherwise,
I divide the jurisdiction into location sets until the criterion holds. For example, the city
of Kirkland, WA in King County had 2 available licenses and 9 census tracts, so it is small
enough to count as one location set. On the other hand, the city of Bellevue had 4 available
licenses and 29 census tracts so it is split into two location sets. Figure 6 shows Seattle, the
21The full-blown model (allowing full demand spillovers, jurisdictions as entire location sets) can be compu-
tationally infeasible to estimate if we have more than, for example, 3 firms and 20 locations in a jurisdiction.
A quick calculation shows that the total number of computations required, per parameter candidate, in
the location decision game when the order is revealed for n firms and l locations is ln. 203 = 8000, but
204 = 160, 000. Seattle’s full case would require 13121 computations for each parameter candidate in stage
2 and 21! orders in stage 1, both of which are computationally infeasible.
22Being conservative with the number of location sets allows us to more naturally use the market’s
jurisdiction-level license regulations without additional assumptions on firm behavior.
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largest jurisdiction with 131 census tracts and 21 licenses, split into 6 location sets 23. There
are a total of 122 location sets, having a minimum of 1 firm to a maximum of 4 firms each.
Figure 1.6: Seattle Divided into 6 Location Sets
A natural question that arises is, once the criterion declares that a certain jurisdiction
should be split into location sets, how to carve up the location sets. Often, cities designate
subdivisions and neighborhoods based a combination of geographical and demographic fac-
tors, so I follow some of these existing subdivisions when dividing jurisidictions into location
sets. Anecdotally, a retailer in a trendy, bohemian neighborhood of a city recalled his neigh-
23The Appendix shows how Seattle is split into 6 location sets, as well as the full list of location sets.
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borhood choice based on being in tune with the neighbors’ cannabis-related preferences. A
different retailer, on the other hand, explained his desire to be near a college campus to
serve that demographic on the basis of different preferences both in price and quality. Geo-
graphically, these subdivisions usually follow natural boundaries like rivers or lakes, or large
artificial boundaries like interstate highways 24.
The setting for the model includes potential firms f ∈ Fm, |Am| =
∑
j |Ajm| locations
in each jurisdiction m, and the order of the location decision game, revealed in stage 2. In
stage 1, firms’ expectation is that this order is realized according to a uniform distribution.
Firms receive a normally distributed shock εLS at the beginning of stage 1 and a logit shock
εf (a) at the beginning of stage 2. They are ex ante identical in stage 1 at the location-set
level. A timeline of the game’s decisions is given below:
1.6.0.2 Stages of the Game
Stage 1 (Application): Potential firms simultaneously decide to submit an appli-
cation in a jurisdiction where the regulator has a cap of n̄ firms. Potential firms in a location
set Ajm all receive the same normally distributed shock.
Regulator gives out licenses. In those jurisdictions where the cap binds, licenses are
awarded via a lottery. Order of moves is ‘revealed’ in each location set/jurisdiction.
Stage 2 (Location): Licensed firms sequentially decide where to enter. Firms
receive a publicly known firm-location-specific logit shock.
Stage 3 (Price-Setting): Firms play a Nash-Bertrand pricing game.
Stage 4 (Consumer Demand): Consumer purchase products at a nearby retailer.
Since the first stages take expectations of later stages and thus require the latter stage
24An alternative method would involve selecting location sets that achieves the desired computational
feasibility through a k-nearest neighbors method that takes user discretion out of the location set selection.
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parameters, I describe the model in reverse order, starting from consumer demand.
1.6.1 Consumer Demand
Market size is defined as in Hollenbeck and Uetake (2019): potential consumption of
cannabis in Washington State:
Mz = [Population > 21]× 4 (1.4)
Where z is a census tract. Potential consumption is set at 4 times the population
over 21 years old to allow for up to 4 grams or units per person per month. I assume
consumers live at the population-weighted center of census tracts z. Each census tract
is characterized through dz, the distance between census tract z’s population center and
each retailer’s coordinates Dz, demographic information on census tract z. Consumers h at
location z choose a firm f from Fh, the set of firms in their choice set, and select product
j from f ’s product set, Jf . Products are aggregated at the product category level, so each
retailer has at most 4 products (usables, solid edibles, liquid edibles, inhalables).
A consumer’s choice set is Bh(z) = {(j, f)|f ∈ Fh, dfh(z) ≤ rh} as in Holmes (2011)
and Thomas (2019), where Fh is the set of firms available to household h at z. Choice sets
are exogenous, and chosen so that all consumers have at least 3 firms.
I specify a nested-logit demand model that includes distance between the consumer’s
location and the firm’s location. Consumption of (j, f) yields utility
uh(z)jft = α(1 + τm)pjft + xjftβ + ξjft + d(zh, zf , Dz;λ) + ε̄hjft (1.5)
where d is disutility generated by transportation costs
dhf = d(zh, zf , Dz;λ) = λ1dr(zh, zf ) + λ2dr(zh, zf )× ln(PopDen(zh)) (1.6)
ε̄hjft = ζhf + (1 − ρ)εhjft is an i.i.d. Type I Extreme Value taste shock, composed
of ζhf , the idiosyncratic firm shock and εhjft, the product-level shock, pjft is the pre-tax
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retail price, before taxes, of good j at firm f , τm is the jurisdiction’s total sales tax, xjft
are product characteristics such as a constant and chemical potency, number of categories
offered, and number of brands offered, dr(zh, zf ) is the distance between consumer at h and
firm f , and PopDen(zh) is the population density at location zh.
25.
The outside option is
uh0 = ΠDh + γh0 + εh0 (1.9)
where Dz is a vector of demographic characteristics (percentage of people above age
45, logged population density, logged median income) and γh0 is normalized to 0. The outside
option represents any cannabis purchased outside the legal recreational market.
The choice probability of consumer h in census tract z of purchasing product j from
firm f is:
szjft(δjft, θ,Dz) =





Where the inclusive value term is defined as:
Izf = (1− ρ)log
∑
j∈F
exp((δfjt + dzf )/(1− ρ)) (1.11)
and




25Note that this set up is a special case of the random coefficients nested-logit (RCNL) model, where the
mean product utility is
δjft = α(1 + τm)pjft + βXjft + ξjft (1.7)
and the household-specific utility is
dfh(z) = X2 × [Πdh + Σνh] = Πdh (1.8)
and we set Σ = 0, X2 = 1, and dh = (dr(zh, zf ), dr(zh, zf ) ∗ log(PopDenzh)
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Then, total demand at census tract z for product j by firm f is szjft×Mz, where Mz
is the number of people in the census tract z times 4 (to allow for up to 4 grams or units





where Zf = {z|f ∈ Bz} is the set of census tracts that have firm f in their choice sets.
1.6.2 Retailer Price-Setting
Retailers set prices each month that they are in the market. I assume each store is




(pjf − cjf )×Qjf (1.14)
where cjf = c̄jf +ωjf , the cost of product j, is the wholesale cost observed in the data
plus an unobserved marginal cost. Observed and unobserved marginal costs are assumed to
have independent distributions, Fc and Fω, respectively, i.i.d. across products.










The firms’ first-order conditions follow the matrix form:
pf − cf + ∆−1Qf = 0 (1.16)
26The market initially allowed for up to 3 licenses per applicant, allowing the possibility of chains. While
some retailers operate as chains, the market’s early stages do not appear to show chain-driven advantages.
Anecdotally, some of the chain-affiliated retailers appeared to make pricing and inventory purchasing deci-
sions at the establishment level, independent of the headquarters, while using the chain image to provide a
more standardized customer experience, e.g. budtender training, rewards programs, etc.
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The first-order conditions are used to obtain counterfactual prices when I vary the
distances between consumers and firms in the location decision stage.
1.6.3 Location Decision
The location decision stage occurs at the beginning of the market, after firms obtain
their licenses.
Players: Firms f = 1, . . . , N that obtained a license in jurisdiction m. Each firm is
endowed with a location set Ajm at the beginning of the game. There are |M| jurisdictions.
Actions: At the beginning of the market, each firm f chooses a location af ∈ Ajm,
where Ajm = {1, . . . , Ljm} is a firm f ’s choice set in its location set. In this setting, an
action is a census tract l in the jurisdiction m. Firms only choose a location within their
assigned location set.
Firms choose locations based on the sum of present discounted profits they expect
to receive over their time present in the market. Firms receive a εf (a), an unobservable (to
the econometrician) firm-action-specific shock, which helps rationalize differences in location
choices beyond demand and costs 27.
Information Set I2: licensed firms know the information set of the entry stage I1,
the identity of firms that received a license, the order of the sequential game, and each other’s
εf (a). At this point, firms know everything, making this is a game of complete information.
I assume that the order for each location set is realized at the beginning of the location
decision stage and assume firms know the order.
27In practice, the shock helps rationalize the fact that retailers did not have access to financial services,
which precluded them from getting access to retail space that was being paid through a mortgage and would
otherwise have been profitable and available. This real-life complication further restricts the locations that
retailers could choose to open their businesses.
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Payoffs: The profit function each firm faces at the beginning of the market is
πf (a, x, ε) = max(π̄f (a, x) + εf (a), 0) (1.17)
where
π̄f (a, x) = rf (a, x)− s(af , x) (1.18)
where rf (a, x) are variable profits of firm f choosing location l and its competitors choosing
locations l′, s(af , x) is a parametric function that represents location-specific fixed costs of
the action firm f chooses. Not choosing any location yields payoff 0.
Equilibrium: The equilibrium of the location decision game is subgame perfect,
where the game is solved by backward induction. The game occurs simultaneously in each
location set in a jurisdiction.
Example: Suppose that in jurisdiction m, there are 2 firms and 2 locations, and
realized order of moves is firm 1 moves first. Then the game is solved by: firm 1 chooses its
optimal location, a∗1. Then firm 2, observing firm 1’s decision, chooses its optimal location,
a∗2(a
∗







I allow unrestricted demand spillovers for consumers, meaning that consumers can
purchase goods at any firm in any location set or jurisdiction given the assigned radius rh,
specified in the demand system’s choice set. However, I allow spillovers for firms across
location sets and jurisdictions in a very specific way: otherwise, a firm in a location set
would have to consider where firms in the adjacent location sets will locate, which can be-
come computationally infeasible. The restrictions on firms limits the neighborhoods in the
jurisdiction where they can locate. These assumptions allow me to keep track of demand in
other location sets to a certain extent when deciding locations in a given location set. Con-
ceptually, one can think of the behavioral assumptions of firms as an oblivious equilibrium,
where firms in a location set know the number of firms in an adjacent location set and have a
general idea of what they may do without fully keeping track of each other’s state variables.
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1.6.4 Application Game
The first stage of the game involves potential firms applying to secure a license to
operate in the market. Conceptually, the game is akin to a standard model of entry, but
potential firms are not guaranteed to enter when they apply due to the license restrictions.
I nest binding/nonbinding license cap outcomes in a standard entry model, such that
a license cap binding or not binding is an outcome of the game. Note that if the cap goes to
infinity, the model collapses to the Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) entry model. On top of this,
I augment this model to include location sets. Adding location sets constitute a nontrivial
wrinkle since the firms’ decisions to apply depends on 1) profitability at the location set
level that interacts across location sets and across jurisdictions and 2) binding/nonbinding
outcome at the jurisdiction level.
Players: Nm identical potential firms f ∈ Fm in jurisdictions m ∈M.
If a jurisdiction is large enough, potential firms f ∈ Fm are assigned a location
set Ajm ⊆ Am according to a probability distribution, which can be either uniform or
dependent on the population/demand/other characteristics of the market. The location set
that potential firms are assigned to is known to all other potential firms.
The number of potential firms by jurisdiction varies based on population: e.g I fix the
number of potential firms for Seattle city limits, and scale up or down in other jurisdictions
based on the population difference 28.
Actions: Simultaneously, firms apply or do not apply for a license in their jurisdiction
m.
Information set: I1. Potential firms know each potential firm’s location set Ajm,
demand and costs at each action af ∈ Ajm, and the number of available licenses n̄m in the
28For example, if Seattle has 300 potential firms and Tacoma has half of Seattle’s population, then Tacoma
would have 150 potential firms
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jurisdiction. Potential firms have an expectation that the order of moves in which firms
choose locations in stage 2 will be revealed in stage 2 according to a uniform distribution.
Payoffs: Potential firms face an expected profit function and decide to apply based
on a zero-profit condition.
The expected profit equation is very similar to a simplified case without location sets.
The total number of applicants nm in a jurisdiction m is equal to the sum of applicants















where 1{∑LS nLS≥n̄m} is an indicator of whether the total number of applicants in
a jurisdiction exceeds the number of licenses, thus implying a binding cap, n̄m∑
LS nLS
is the
probability that an applicant in a binding jurisdiction receives a license, the inner expectation
is over possible orders in stage 2 and how many competitors they expect to have ([kj]), rLS(·)
are variable profits, calculated from demand and marginal costs, sLS(·) are location-specific
fixed costs, calculated from cost of real estate at the chosen location, estimated in the location
game, and FLS is the sunk cost of applying/entering.
Note that every potential firm pays a sunk cost, even those in binding jurisdictions
that may not receive a license. Also, any profits potential firms expect to make once they
receive a license (revenues minus marginal costs minus cost of real estate) is weighted by the
probability of getting a license.
1.6.4.1 Modeling Expectations
Potential firms know that once they get a license, they will play a sequential game
of location decision. At the time of applying, however, they don’t know the order of moves.
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Thus, they have expectations over the profits they can obtain from applying based on the
available locations.
Expectations over distributions
Since the εf (LS, a) is revealed to firms in stage 2, I integrate firms’ expected profits
upon receiving a license by the distribution of the firm-location specific shock they will
receive in stage 2. In addition, I also integrate over the distribution of orderings, from where
the order revealed in stage 2 will be drawn from.
Example of taking expectations over orderings:
I provide a brief example of how expectations over orderings are computed:
Suppose we have 2 firms in one location set with two locations, Am = {a1, a2}.
Suppose firms anticipate that the order in stage 2 is follows a uniform distribution so there
are nm! = 2! = 2 possible orders):
Assume that choosing location 1 is more profitable than choosing location 2 and that
if a firm chooses location 1 first, then the second-mover chooses location 2. The profits for
firm 1 equal the probability of firm 1 moving first (which equals 0.5) times the payoff of
selecting the optimal location if firm 1 moves first (in this toy example, it is location 1 (and
firm 2 selecting location 2)), plus the probability of firm 1 moving second (which equals 0.5)
times the payoff of selecting the second-best location (in this toy example, location 2 (and
firm 2 selecting location 1)). Then, the expected profits of firm 1 are:
E[r1(a, x)− s1(a, x)|I] = Prob(f 11 )(r1(a11, x)− s1(a11, x))
+ Prob(f 21 )(r1(a
2
1, x)− s1(a21, x))
(1.20)
with the locations in each clause chosen by the aforementioned logit-style choice probabilities.
If there are, for example, 3 firms applying, there will be 3! = 6 orders, and so on.
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Case 1: Jurisdictions with more than one location set, if the cap is non-
binding:
Each location set has potential firms applying until it is not profitable to apply in
that location set. Effectively, there is a zero-profit condition at the location-set level. For
example, let n̄m = 4, nA1 = 2 and nA2 = 2. This means that 2 potential firms applied in
location set A1, which implies a 3rd applicant would not find it profitable, and likewise for
location set A2. Since the cap does not bind, there is a zero-profit condition in effect for
each location set.
Case 2: Jurisdictions with more than one location set, if the cap is binding:
I describe three main features that appear when the cap is binding for large juris-
dictions: first, the profit function exhibits a kink. Second, I describe how to compute the
expected number of firms that will get a license in each location set through the lottery.
Third, the interaction between nLS’s within a jurisdiction.
First, I explain how the expected profit function changes as we move from n̄m (no
lottery conducted) applicants to n̄m + 1 (lottery is conducted) applicants. There will be a
kink in the profit function as a function of number of applicants at the jurisdiction level.
Before the cap, the profit function would decrease at some fixed slope. Once it exceeds
the cap, the profit function will still decrease in the number of applicants but at a different
slope. In practice, this jump is minimized by weighing potential firms’ expected profits by
the probability of obtaining a license.
Second, suppose we already have the number of applicants {n∗Ajm}j for an equilibrium.
Since the number of licenses in each location set will be awarded by lottery, we can compute
the expected number of licenses for each location set. Call this statistic [kAj ]. I can calculate
[kj] by multiplying the likelihood of getting a license,
n̄m∑
LS nLS
, by the number of applicants
nAj in location set Aj in jurisdiction m and obtaining the whole number from the expression.
46
Example:
I show how [kj] is computed using a simplified version of the description above. Let:
• n̄m = 4: number of licenses for a jurisdiction m.
• Nm = 10: number of potential firms in jurisdiction m.
• j = 2: number of location sets Ajm in jurisdiction m.
• nA1 = 5: number of potential firms assigned to location set A1.
• nA2 = 5: number of potential firms assigned to location set A2.
• n∗A1 = 3: number of potential firms that apply in location set A1.






= 5: number of potential firms that apply in jurisdiction m.
[kA1 ] = [
4
3+2
3] = [2.4] = 2
[kA2 ] = [
4
3+2
2] = [1.6] = 2
In this example, we can expect 2 firms to receive licenses in location set A1 and 2




Once we have the [kAj ], we can calculate the expected profits upon getting a license,
E[rf (·)− sf (·)|I] by taking expectations over orderings based on the number of competitors
a firm is expected to have, just as described in the nonbinding case section.
Thirdly, the number of applicants in location sets within a jurisdiction may interact,
making it unclear how an equilibrium is computed. For example, it may occur that 3 potential
29This equality holds for most simple examples but is not a mathematical result due to rounding: in those
jurisdictions where equality is not satisfied, I order location sets in the jurisdiction by population and obtain
equality by assigning fewer applicants to the less populated location sets.
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firms applying in location set 1 may prompt only 2 potential firms to apply in location set
2, but if it location set 2 had moved first, more potential firms could have applied. I solve
this issue by imposing timing assumptions across location sets 30.
Equilibrium: As in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991), the equilibrium is in the number
of firms, meaning that the identity of applicants is unimportant. The equilibrium number
of applicant firms in each market m is defined as {Nm}Mm=1. It is governed by a zero-profit
condition at the location-set level such that
E[πf (N
∗
LS)|I] ≥ 0 > E[πf (N∗LS + 1)|I] (1.21)
In jurisdictions with more than one location set, nm =
∑
LS nLS, where the number
of applicants in a location set is such that no applicant is willing to deviate. This means
that the equilibrium vector for a jurisdiction, if the jurisdiction has more than 1 location set,
will be an j-vector of number of applicants nLSj , one for each location set. If a jurisdiction
only has one location set, it has a scalar number of firms applying in equilibrium, which is
exactly the Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) model.
Without additional assumptions, the equilibrium in number of applicants nm is not
unique. First, there may be multiple equilibria in a jurisdiction where N∗m firms apply
in jurisdiction m but depending on which location set ’moves’ first, leading to different
combinations of N∗LS. I resolve this multiple equilibria issue in N’s in location sets by
introducing a timing assumption in the order of moves: I assume the most populated location
set in a jurisdiction move first. Second, there may be multiple equilibria in N’s across
jurisdictions because jurisdictions are related through the spillovers in the consumer demand
stage. I resolve this multiple equilibria issue in jurisdictions by assuming the most populated
30I address the third point in more detail in the equilibrium walk-through section in the Appendix.
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jurisdictions ’move’ first. These two conditions ensure a unique equilibrium in the number
of applicants.
I now turn to a description of estimable versions of the game described above, as well
as the methods used to estimate the structural parameters.
1.7 Estimation Description
Because the earlier stages use structural parameters that are recovered in the later
stages, I describe the estimation steps by starting from the last stage and proceeding in a
backward fashion.
1.7.1 Demand Estimation
I estimate the consumer demand model following Berry, Levinsohn, and Pakes (1995).
I follow Grigolon and Verboven (2014)’s method of modifying the Berry, Levinsohn and
Pakes (1995) contraction mapping for a nested-logit model to obtain the unique vector
δ∗jf (xjf , sjf ; θ), which obtains mean utility values from observed market shares s
obs
jf : equating
the observed market share vector to the predicted market share vector sobsjf = sjf (δjf ; θ).
However, since the consumer demand model does not have clearly defined markets 31, I am
unable to compute market shares in the traditional way. Instead, I use observed and model
quantities at the product-firm-month level:
δt+1jf = δ
t
jf + (1− ρ)(ln(Qobsjf )− ln(Qjf (δtjf ))) (1.22)
I concentrate out the linear parameters and estimate the model by searching over the
nonlinear parameters 32 such that the objective function of the GMM is minimized 33. For
31The choice set constructed for each consumer allows consumers to travel across jurisdictions, so there is
no traditional notion of a clearly defined ‘market’ in this application.
32Using the fminsearch command in MATLAB, which uses the Nelder-Mead method
33I also estimate this model via the MPEC method outlined in Dubé, Fox and Su (2012), yielding similar
estimates.
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starting values, I use W = (Z ′Z)−1 for the GMM weighting matrix and the coefficients from
a 2SLS regression.
1.7.1.1 Instruments
The model suffers from the usual endogeneity problem in demand estimation: after
we take the variation from product categories, store and trimester-year fixed effects, there
is an unobservable ξjft that varies over time and within retailers. We may be concerned
about a demand shock to a product category at a retailer in a given month. To address this
potential endogeneity concern, I include a number of instruments.
I include the usual BLP instruments, which are the average characteristics of a firm’s
other products, and the average characteristics of competitor’s products. I also include
the wholesale price of competitors’ products. A potentially important measure of product
quality is, beyond the potency variables in the demand system, the amount of THCA, a
non-psychoactive cannabinoid that is a precursor to THC. As the product dries, THCA
converts into THC and depending on the mode of consumption (e.g. combustion), the user
may obtain more THC out of the product. More THCA present may impact price due to
the product being harvested more recently, something I do not observe. Lastly, I include the
logged distance to the nearest competitor, which, as shown in the reduced-form results, is
an important variable for price competition among retailers.
I also include instruments that help identify the nonlinear components of preferences
Σ,Π, and ρ. Identification requires the conditional shares of the inside goods, which are
represented by the percentage of product category j sold at store f , to have exogenous
variation. I include the monthly number of products in a product category sold by a retailer,
the mean sales price of within-retailer competing products, and the mean values of the cost
shifters for within-retailer competing products.
The demand estimation yields the parameters governing consumers’ preferences to-
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ward price, product characteristics, travel costs, and substitution within and across stores.
These parameters are used in the retail price-setting stage, described below.
1.7.2 Retail Price-Setting
Following Thomas (2019) and Wollmann (2018), I use the pricing equation and the
demand coefficients to obtain the unobserved marginal costs and, when recomputing the
equilibrium in the counterfactual section, to compute new equilibrium prices. Inserting the
demand estimates into the pricing equation yields an implicit function of pjft, which can be
backed out via iterated best response.
pf = cf + ∆
−1(θ)Qf (θ, pf ) (1.23)
I follow Morrow and Skerlos (2010)’s method of modifying the first-order condition
to construct a fixed point mapping of the price 34.
The unobserved marginal costs ωjft are obtained via the following inversion of the
first-order condition:
ωf = pf − c̄f −∆−1Qf (pf ) (1.24)
When computing variable profits for each possible alternative location arrangement,
firms consider different locations for their store, which changes their distance to consumers,
which affects the quantities sold. Firms respond to this mechanism by adjusting their prices
according to the first-order condition above.




Each firm chooses the location in their assigned location set that yields the greatest
lifetime profits, in the jurisdiction they received a license, based on competitors’ optimal
decisions. Firms only search over their assigned location set or jurisdiction. In this stage,
the order is revealed to firms. The game is now complete information.
The game is sequential, meaning that players move in the order given to them by
‘nature’. I assume the observed vector of locations is the subgame perfect equilibrium of
this game and the observed order in the data is the realized order. Before specifying the
estimation of the location-specific fixed costs, I parameterize the game’s payoffs and actions
to make the model estimable:
1.7.3.1 Parameterization
Firms choose the location (a census tract) that yields the greatest present discounted
value of profits πf (a, x, ε), given its competitors’ decisions and the realized order of moves.
Recall that firms’ profits are of the form:
πf (a, x, ε) = max(π̄f + εf (a), 0) (1.25)
where π̄f are the sum of present discounted payoffs for a firm f over its lifetime from choosing
an action a. If a firm does not choose any location, it receives a payoff of 0. The profits π̄f
from choosing a location take the form:
π̄f (a, x, ε) =
138∑
t=1
βt[rft(a, x)− sft(a, x)] + εf (a) (1.26)
where the monthly cost of location is kept fixed over time, sft(a, x) = sf (a, x), the variable
profits are time-varying according to variables (pjft, xjft, ξjft) and the monthly fixed effects,
and the discount factor β is set at 0.98. Since I only observe these variables up until the end
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of the data, I draw 120 additional months worth of data from the last 3 months of available
data to construct the monthly variable profits for future time periods 35.
I further parameterize the terms inside the profit function to obtain:
rf (a, x) = rf (af , a−f ;x, θ) (1.27)
which are the variable profits of firm f choosing action af and its competitors choosing a−f .
Further parameterization of the variable profit to include the demand parameters yields:
rft(af , a−f ;x, θ) =
∑
j∈Jft
(pjft(x)− cjft(x))Qjft(af , a−f ;x, θ) (1.28)
where Jft is the set of products that firm f offers in month t, Qjft is the quantity sold (which
depends on its competitors), at sales price pjft and at wholesale price cjft,
sft(af , x) = s(af , x; γ) = γX(af ) (1.29)
which is the location-specific fixed cost of firm f choosing action af , which reflects the cost
of real estate X in location l in jurisdiction m.
I use average monthly rent and mortgage payments as proxies for the cost of real
estate in census tract l.
εf (a) is a firm-location-specific Type I Extreme Value unobservable (to the econome-
trician).
1.7.3.2 Equilibrium computation
To find the equilibrium, I assume firms move sequentially and the order is announced
at the beginning of this stage, according to a uniform distribution 36. To estimate γ, the
35I assume firms exist for 10 years after the data ends. 10 years, equivalent to 120 months, plus the 18
months of the data, equals 138 months of operation.
36Meaning all possible orderings are equally likely.
53
parameters governing the location-specific fixed costs, I use a method of simulated moments
estimator to find the γ that minimizes the deviations of the predicted equilibrium of location
decisions from the observed location decisions 37.
The reason for taking a sequential route is twofold. First, to more accurately reflect
the idea that once a firm opens in a given location, other firms may react to this and choose a
potentially different location 38. Second, a sequential model can reduce the time required to
compute the equilibrium. Using an iterated best response method to solve a simultaneous-
move location decision game, the procedure would loop back when it reaches the nth firm
so that the first firm can re-optimize, and given my number of locations, the equilibrium
computation can quickly become computationally burdensome.
This procedure involves using the order of moves observed in the data to construct
moments which include the equilibrium location decisions, and matching the model’s location
decisions with the data’s location decisions. I explain how to construct the moments for the
method of simulated moments estimator.
1.7.3.3 Method of simulated moments estimator
Recall that a market m is a location set or a jurisdiction (if a jurisdiction is its
own location set). Let zm be exogenous data for market m: I use the precint-level I-502
referendum results ’yes’ percentages and the number of underage people in each census
tract, as well as demographic variables that were excluded from the demand estimation. I
provide a brief walkthrough of how the moments are constructed:
• First, use the order om observed in the data O for each market m.
37Alternatively, I also explain how to estimate the parameters with a maximum simulated likelihood
estimator.
38This assumption of the game indeed occurs in the data, with about 25% of licensed firms locating farther
than a third of a mile from their proposed location.
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• Draw εsm, s=1,...,S for each market m. εsm is a vector of shocks, one for each firm-
location.
• For the observed order om and for each εsm, compute the subgame perfect equilibrium
vector of locations ŷsm(εsm, om, γ, zm) for each market using the game tree induced by
the realized order and available locations.
• Construct the function µ(·), which tracks location decisions for each firm in market m.
• The estimator is obtained by subtracting the µ evaluated at the the simulated data
















µ(ŷsm(εsm, om, γ, zm) = l)]⊗ g(zm)‖
(1.30)
For arbitrary functions µ and g. γ is found via a nonlinear search.
I currently specify µ as a function that returns the number 1 if all firms in a certain
location set choose the vector of locations l out of all possible permutations of locations LNmm
and 0 otherwise. As an example, suppose there are 2 firms and 3 locations. Then there are a
total of 32 = 9 possible outcomes. Then one location vector could be (l1, l3) and the function
µ checks whether firms 1 and 2 chose those locations.




39Using Continuously Updating Estimator and A = I as the initial weighting matrix.
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Thus, γ is a dimension nγ by 1 parameter, g(zm) is a nγ ∗ nG vector for each location
set/jurisdiction, GMSM(γ) is a n ∗ nG vector, and A is a nG ∗ nG matrix, where nG is the
number of moments, and there are at least nG instruments.
1.7.3.4 Identification
γ is identified off differences in the cost of real estate between locations l. Since I do
not have data on census-tract level monthly lease costs, I proxy the cost of leasing a store
X(af ) with the monthly gross rent for renters in the census tract from the 2014 American
Community Survey. I also include the median value of owner-occupied units, as well as
selected monthly costs for renters.
γ is identified up to ‘scale’, so I normalize the location with the lowest cost of real
estate. The η parameters from the sunk costs in the application stage described below
identify the ‘intercept’. The idea is that no matter the location they choose, the difference
between the revenue at that location and the cost of leasing at that location is positive, and
the fixed cost estimation picks up the level from the remaining variation. If the difference
is negative, then that location is not profitable for firm f and is not chosen. I do not allow
licensed firms to not choose a location.
With γ estimated, I turn to the F (η) sunk cost estimation.
1.7.4 Entry Estimation
I begin by setting a number for the potential firms in Seattle, and then scale down to
other jurisdictions based on population 40. The goal is to estimate the sunk cost of applying
40Recall that I observe nm, nAjm , n̄m, rf (·), sf (·), the observed kAj , and whether a jurisdiction-level cap
binds or not from the data and from the previous estimation steps. What I do not observe is the number
of potential firms Nm (before applying) and the sunk cost F. A standard approach is to make sensible
assumptions on the number of potential firms and estimate the sunk costs. A different method would be to
employ an estimate of the sunk cost and back out the number of potential firms. Since I lack detailed data
on firms’ sunk costs or how much a retail establishment costs, I follow the former approach.
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to be a firm in the market.
Before describing the sunk cost estimation strategy, I explain how I parameterize the
sunk costs:
1.7.4.1 Parameterization
Let the location-set-level application sunk cost be defined by
FLS = ηX
C
LS + εLS (1.32)
where XCm are location-set-level variables such as logged population, cost-of-living
indices, and logged population density. εLS is a mean zero normally distributed shock at the
location set level.
1.7.4.2 Constructing the likelihood function
I follow Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) in creating a log likelihood to estimate η 41.
















The expected profit function indicates that the sunk cost for all potential firms is the same,
after conditioning for location-set level covariates), regardless of whether the license cap
binds or not. This assumption is more innocuous than it appears to be: first, if the license
cap binds, expected profits are weighted by the probability of obtaining a license, which
drives expected variable profits down. Second, a substantial part of the variation in sunk
41The application stage involves evaluating the likelihood function at each market, and has one data point
for each location set/jurisdiction: a total of 122 data points.
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costs is absorbed in the location-specific fixed costs from stage 2, so the sunk costs Fm is net
of differences in cost of real estate and profitability, and is more related to the sunk cost of
opening a store in the jurisdiction, which gets more at the ‘level‘ rather than the ‘slope’.
The expression above is equivalent to
E[πf,LS(a, x)|I] = VLS(·)− FLS = (VLS(·)− ηXCLS) + εLS = πLS(·) + εLS (1.34)
Since N∗LS potential firms applied in each location set, we can assume it was profitable
for N∗LS to apply but not for N
∗
LS + 1 firms. We can then obtain a set of inequalities of the
following form:
V (N∗LS, xLS)− FLS ≥ 0 (1.35)
and
V (N∗LS + 1, xLS)− FLS < 0 (1.36)
Combining, we obtain
V (N∗LS, xLS) ≥ FLS > V (N∗LS + 1, xLS) (1.37)
The inequalities serve as bounds that can specify the probability of observing N∗
firms:
P (V (N∗LS, xLS) ≥
FLS|xLS)− P (V (N∗LS + 1, xLS) > F |xLS)
= Φ(V (N∗LS, xLS, η)|xLS)− Φ(V (N∗LS + 1, xLS, η)|xLS)
(1.38)
Where Φ(·) is the cdf of the standard normal distribution, since εLS is assumed normal.
I then construct a likelihood function for N∗LS, the observed number of applicants
in each location set. If I assumed independent and identical sampling assumptions, the
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ln(Φ(V (N∗LS, xLS, η))− Φ(V (N∗LS + 1, xLS, η))) (1.39)
However, recall that a crucial assumption in Bresnahan and Reiss (1991) is that
firms’ unobservable profits must be statistically independent across markets. In this model, I
assume observed profits are interrelated across location sets and jurisdictions 42. To maintain
internal consistency, I slightly modify the log likelihood and use a joint likelihood function:
L(η|{xLS, N∗LS}) = ln(Φ(V (N1)∗, ..., V (N∗LS), x, η)− Φ(V (N∗1 + 1), ..., V (N∗LS + 1), x, η))
(1.40)
where Φ(·) is a multi-dimensional normal cdf. Once the likelihood function is specified,
it is maximized to obtain the estimated η parameters.
To construct the V (N∗LS + 1, xLS, η) term, I simulate a nLS + 1th applicant for the
jurisdiction/location set. If the license cap in a jurisdiction is already binding, I merely
consider the decreased probability of getting a license and its corresponding decrease in
expected profits of an additional applicant. If the license cap is nonbinding, I simulate an
additional applicant by drawing from the distributions for observed and unobserved product
characteristics and costs that were estimated in the previous stages.
I provide a walkthrough of how I construct the V (N∗LS + 1, xLS, η) term: for a given
jurisdiction, I simulate an additional firm with parameters (α, β, λ, ρ) as estimated in the
demand stage and ξ drawn from the recovered distribution Fξ for that jurisdiction. Suppose
N∗LS = 3, so I select the 4 most profitable locations in the jurisdiction/location set and
‘place’ the 4 firms in each permutation of the 4 locations. Each firm serves census tracts with
42Due to the nature of demand, which is spatial.
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consumers based on the same radius distance as specified in the consumer demand model. For
each of these permutations, I can calculate each consumer’s choice probabilities shjf |f , shft,
which allows me to calculate each firm’s sold quantities Qjft. I can then calculate variable
profits for each permutation of locations, which allows me to compute the new ‘equilibrium’
vector of location decisions for each ordering (4 firms for 4 locations, and depending on who
moves first). Finally, I calculate V (N∗LS + 1, xm, η).
1.8 Results
1.8.1 Demand Estimates
Table 10 presents estimates from the demand estimation. Most coefficients have the
expected signs and are precisely estimated: consumers dislike high prices and large distances
to stores, and prefer greater THC and CBD potency. Extracts are the most preferred cate-
gory, followed by solid edibles, usables, and liquid edibles. The nesting parameter is about
0.65, which suggests a high degree of substitution between product categories within a store,
but also suggests some degree of substitution across stores 43. Given that I aggregate prod-
ucts up to the category level to avoid extremely small market shares, the nesting parameter
estimate only measures the degree to which consumers substitute across product categories
and does not reflect intra-category substitution. However, intra-category substitution will
be observed through the product category dummies.
Based on the demand estimates, I can compute price elasticities and travel costs,
shown in Tables 11 and 12, respectively. Price elasticities are similar to those observed in the
43This is consistent with anecdotal evidence from store managers that substitution is mainly along product
categories: if a consumer usually purchases a specific kind or brand of usable, he/she is likely to switch to a
different usable in the presence of a price change, instead of switching to a different product category.
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literature for cannabis products, albeit slightly higher for extracts and edibles. Elasticities
are slightly lower for usables, the bulk of the products in the dataset 44. Travel costs are
similar but slightly greater than similar work such as Thomas (2019). This suggests that
consumers are willing to pay $2.75 to avoid travelling 1 mile, which is a significant percentage
considering that the median price per gram for a usable type product is $12 45.
Table 1.11: Elasticities
Usables Solid Edibles Inhalables
10% -2.47 -9.69 -15.32
25% -1.14 -7.60 -12.06
Mean -1.22 -6.33 -10.26
50% -0.70 -5.82 -9.56
75% -0.44 -4.53 -7.85
90% -0.3 -3.49 -6.38







At median census tract population density of 2657 people per square mile, this suggests a
median travel cost of $2.75 per mile.
44One reason for this similar but slight discrepancy in elasticities with the related literature is due to the
fact that I use the first 18 months of the data rather than the last 6 months. Products that require more
processing appear later in the market, so the early stages of the market feature mostly usables, meaning less
substitution to other categories.
45This is consistent with anecdotal evidence that consumers greatly value convenience. Interviews with
consumers in some of these stores report perceiving these retailers as neighborhood shops and having some
knowledge about prices in the black market.
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1.8.2 Unobserved Marginal Costs Estimates
Using the Nash-Bertrand pricing first-order conditions, I back out the unobserved
marginal costs. Figure 7 shows kernel density distributions of retail prices, observed marginal
costs, and unobserved marginal costs 46. I use the combined marginal costs and its distri-
bution to compute retailers’ profit functions when deciding where to locate and whether to
apply, respectively. About 13 percent of unobserved marginal costs are negative, with the
majority of the negative unobserved marginal costs under $5 per unit. However, only 5 per-
cent of combined marginal costs are negative. One potential explanation for this apparent
anomaly is that several retailers reported losing money during the early stages of the market,
using their own funds to pay bills and keep the store open with the expectation that the
market would grow over time 47.
1.8.3 Location Fixed Costs Estimates
I use the demand and unobserved marginal cost estimates to compute the alternative
variable profits for all the possible location configurations for firms in each location set in
the state. Differences in variable profits will be due to the distance and price channels: the
model predicts that firms closer to consumers should bring more profits and firms locating
closer to other firms should lead to lower prices. Combined, the prediction on the sign is
ambiguous. Figure 8 and Table 13 show the distribution of location-specific fixed costs. Since
the closest analogue of these costs to a real-life economic measure is the cost of retail space
rental, I normalize the costs to monthly dollars per square foot by assuming the average
store size is 1900 sq ft 48. The median cost of retail space is $3.58 per square foot, the mean
is $5.79 per square foot, the 25% is $1.99 per square foot, and the 75% is $7.25 per square
46I censor any negative value up to 0 in the figure for clarity purposes.
47This prediction has been proven right: the market has substantially grown since 2017 levels.
48I use the website https://www.thebalancesmb.com/what-it-costs-to-rent-a-building-space-2890493 and
compare the suggested values with actual retail space costs in Washington State from LoopNet, a retail
space leasing search engine.
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Figure 1.7: Distribution of Marginal Cost Estimates
This figure shows the distributions of the retail price, the wholesale price, and the
unobserved marginal costs estimates. I winsorize any negative values of ω to 0 for clarity
purposes.
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foot. These estimates are in line, albeit slightly greater, with retail space rental reports from
search engines such as LoopNet of what to expect to pay, depending on the location of the
store: most retail locations of such a size appear to be between $1 and $4 per square foot,
monthly. One potential explanation for the slightly greater magnitudes in my estimates,
especially at the right tail, is the fact that cannabis retailers were not able to obtain leases
for retail space that had a mortgage through a bank, so in practice, a substantial percentage
built their establishments from scratch with their own funds or through types of financing
associated with higher interest rates.
Figure 1.8: Distribution of Monthly Leasing Costs
This figure shows the distribution of monthly retail space leasing costs assuming the typical
retail store has 1900 sq ft. The mean is $5.79 and the median is $3.58 per square foot. I
winsorize the 90% percentile, $12.95, in the figure for clarity purposes.
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This table shows the estimated distribution of monthly location-specific fixed costs, normal-
ized to dollars per square foot. Intuitively, we can interpret this as the cost to rent retail
space.
1.8.4 Sunk Cost Estimates
Figure 9 and Table 14 show the distribution of the one-time sunk costs of applying
to the market. Intuitive, the sunk cost estimates reflect the opportunity cost that comes
with investigating whether entering the market is economically worthwhile: doing market
research, developing relationships with potential partners, find a retail space, as well as
developing a brand and letting potential customers know of a coming store. The mean is
$21,260, the median is $15,530, the 25% percentile is $12,794, and the 75% is 22,541. While
it is not straightforward to compare these values with observed data, the estimates appear
reasonable, considering that I assume that even firms that apply but do not get a license also
pay this sunk cost. The closest existing estimates of fixed costs for this industry come from
Thomas (2019), which finds bounds for fixed costs of retailer entrants. My estimates are
almost half, which is not surprising considering her measures are closer to firms’ operating
costs, whereas I also measure the sunk costs of those who did not obtain a license and thus
were never active in the market.
1.9 Counterfactuals
I conduct the counterfactual policy scenario of relaxing location restrictions around
sensitive-use areas to 100 feet.
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Figure 1.9: Distribution of Sunk Costs
This figure shows the distribution of one-time sunk costs for applicants. The mean is
$21,260 and the median is $15,530.







This table shows the estimated distribution of one-time sunk costs for applicants that con-
sider obtaining a license to operate in the market. Intuitive, we can interpret these sunk
costs as the opportunity cost of entering the cannabis market.
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This involves increasing the number of available locations in a jurisdiction/location
set while keeping the number of licenses fixed. In my model, firms that received a license have
a fixed set of locations to choose from in their set Afm. Within this set, not all locations were
available in the baseline model, since I exclude census tracts whose schools are closer than
1000 ft from the census tract centroid. For this counterfactual, I consider all census tracts
within this location set where its schools are further than 100 feet from their population-
weighted centroid. To keep the model computationally feasible, 20 locations per location
set/jurisdiction is the upper bound of available locations. When estimating the model, the
number of available locations was always less than 20.
The process to find the counterfactual locations would consist of solving the model
from the beginning and recomputing the equilibrium of the game, since more locations be-
coming available means that jurisdictions may become more profitable, so more potential
firms may apply. I start with the baseline, observed number of applicants, and let the entry
equilibrium run in the population-driven order, meaning that the most populous jurisdictions
consider an additional applicant first, and within a jurisdiction, the most populous location
sets consider an additional applicant first. While expected profits for all jurisdictions and
location sets are non-negative, I add an additional applicant, and continue until a jurisdic-
tion/location set does not find it profitable to consider an additional applicant. This may
lead to more jurisdictions binding. For nonbinding jurisdictions that consider an additional
applicant, I simulate an additional firm. For jurisdictions that hit their license cap, I consider
an additional applicant but do not simulate an additional firm’s characteristics because no
more firms can enter into the second stage. Instead, the additional applicant weighs down
the expected profits of the first stage, since more applicants decreases the probability of any
one applicant receiving a license. Once licenses are given out, the location game is played
with the now larger set of locations. Once the locations are chosen, we plug the new locations
into the housing model to calculate the new externality measure.
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Before calculating the entry equilibrium, I start letting kj equal the observed number
of licensed firms in each location set, like a rational expectations setting. Given kj, n̄m,
∑
LS nLS,
the only unknown is nLS, the number of applicants in each location set, so I back it out
through linear systems of equations. I perform a sanity check after calculating nLS to make
sure that the kj terms these numbers of applicants add up to the licensed number of firms
in the jurisdiction. For the great majority of cases,
∑
LS[kLS] = n̄m. However, this is not a
mathematical result since as the number of rounded up/down terms increases, the likelihood
of going over n̄m increases. To maintain the equality, I tweak how kj is computed by as-
suming that, in the event of the equality not being satisfied, the least populated location set
breaks the tie by having one fewer applicant: first, I compute kj as in the model section. If
after summing the kj terms up, they add up to n̄m, leave that jurisdiction as is and move on.
If the terms do not add up, remove one expected license from the least populated location
set within that jurisdiction. This process is repeated until the equality is satisfied.
1.10 Counterfactual Results
I show the welfare measures from the baseline, status quo scenario versus the wel-
fare measures from relaxing location restrictions down to 100 ft. Table 15 displays various
measures of welfare in the baseline scenario of 1000 ft restrictions and in the counterfactual
scenario of 100 ft restrictions for King County 49. The sign of the changes in each individual
welfare measure is expected: consumer surplus increases from $17.1 million to $26.9 million,
firm profits increase from $4.2 million to $6.5 million, negative resident externality is exac-
erbated from -$23.8 million to -$25.7 million, sales tax revenue increase from $3.1 million
to $4.8 million due to quantities increasing, and property tax revenue decrease from -$11.3
million to -$12.2 million.
49I provide counterfactual welfare measures for the entire state as well, shown in Table 16, except for
statewide resident externality measures: I only have property data for King County.
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Table 1.15: Counterfactual: Relaxing Location Restrictions to 100 ft, King County
Baseline CF % Change
Consumer Welfare ($) 17,111,019 26,909,987 57.27
Sales Tax Revenue ($) 3,147,136 4,796,784 52.42
Quantity Sold 453,598 693,753 52.85
Firm Profits ($) 4,229,225 6,565,636 52.72
Resident Externality ($) -58,747,056 -63,373,879 -7.88
Property Tax Revenue ($) -11,300,574 -12,190,588.5 -7.87
AvgPopDen 3680 7368 100.22
MedianPopDen 2294 5871 155.92
PopDen25 280 3385 1100.09
PopDen75 5415 9480 7.51
Table 1.16: Counterfactual: Relaxing Location Restrictions to 100 ft
Baseline CF % Change
Consumer Welfare ($) 46,802,646 84,319,356 80.16
Sales Tax Revenue ($) 9,539,400 17,928,194 87.94
Quantity Sold 1,455,036 2,742,174 88.46
Firm Profits ($) 12,945,754 24,307,853 87.76
AvgPopDen 3710 3248 -12.45
MedianPopDen 3015 2215 -26.53
PopDen25 510 353 -30.78
PopDen75 5202 4706 -9.53
On net, both resident surplus and tax revenues are less negative 50 than in the baseline
measures. Overall resident surplus changes from -$6.8 million to $1.1 million and overall
relevant tax revenues increase from -$8.1 million to -$7.4 million. This means that from the
point of view of a regulator or social planner that takes into account both those that obtain
50On the resident side, residents now perceive a surplus.
70
utility from the market’s products and those that receive a disutility from having the market
close to their homes and schools, the gains for consumers offset the losses for residents. The
same pattern appears for tax revenues: the stores impose a negative externality on property
tax revenues, but giving them more options to locate leads to sales tax revenues that offset
any losses from property taxes 51.
One reason behind the net welfare impact on residents for this policy scenario is the
role that travel costs play in consumers’ utility functions. The bottom half of Tables 15
shows summary statistics of the distribution of the population density of the census tracts
chosen by the firms in King County. For King County, the distribution of population density
for chosen location shifts rightward, meaning that at all levels of the distribution, firms
locate in denser locations. Locating near denser areas corresponds to more consumers being
reached, which can lead some consumers to substitute from the outside option to the inside
options of the market. The more dense locations, combined with the importance of travel
costs as shown in Table 12, explain the large increase in consumer surplus. An interesting
pattern that appears in the counterfactual policy scenario is that even though urban areas
display denser location choices, the pattern is reversed for rural areas and overall in the state.
The bottom half of Table 16 shows summary statistics of various levels of the distribution
of population density for location choices in the entire state: compared with the baseline,
counterfactual locations are overall less dense. This is not surprising considering that travel
costs are exacerbated by population density: in less dense areas of the state, the travel cost
is not as big of a deterrent for consumers so firms in general prefer to locate farther from
each other.
In summary, relaxing location restrictions around sensitive-use areas to 100 feet,
when weighing both consumers and residents equally, leads to net welfare and tax revenue
51The caveats on calculating resident surplus without a full-blown model of the housing market are ex-
plicitly stated in the Appendix.
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improvements with heterogeneous impacts on the individual groups studied. Consumers are
better off, firms are better off, and residents are worse off. More sales tax revenue is collected
but less property tax revenue is collected. A social planner that more heavily weighs the
welfare of a particular group may obtain a different net welfare effect: for example, a state
governor that places a greater weight on residents may place little weight on consumers of a
potentially habit-forming and addictive substance but heavy weight on residents, leading to
an opposite conclusion.
1.11 Conclusion
This paper is a case study of how local governments and policy makers can harness the
power of market structure and firms’ endogenous response to regulations to yield desirable
results while minimizing the array of undesirable outcomes. I study the impact of location
restrictions on recreational cannabis retailers in Washington State on residents, consumers,
and taxation. I first show reduced-form evidence that cannabis retailers act as a disamenity
when close to homes and to their assigned schools. Then, I develop and estimate a model of
firm entry and location and consumer demand to analyze the role of various license and loca-
tion restrictions on firms in mitigating externalities to residents. I then use these estimates
to conduct counterfactual land-use policies such as relaxing the location restrictions.
I find that relaxing location restrictions around sensitive-use areas from 1000 ft to
100 ft benefits consumers and firms but harms residents, but on net, leads to welfare and tax
revenue improvements. While the restrictions advocates’ concern of potential exposure of
cannabis to minors plays an economically significant role for households when determining
where to buy a property, especially when cannabis retailers enter near properties’ assigned
schools, these negative impacts are offset by the gains that consumers obtain from a less reg-
ulated market. Anecdotal evidence from town hall debates, which skews toward supporting
more stringent regulations, is unlikely to match the direction of the welfare effects found in
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this study due to not fully accounting for all affected parties from land-use policies.
Some regulations that can be studied with the framework described in this project
are various levels of buffer stringency for location restrictions, stricter dispersal restrictions,
allowing the creation of cannabis business districts by confining the market to specific areas
of cities, various stringency levels of licensing regulations, and welfare maximization through
a social planner’s problem. Concurrent work in Larsen (2020a) incorporates the negative
externality imposed on homebuyers in more comprehensive ways such as allowing for resident
sorting, heterogeneous impacts, and varying beliefs about how the market will evolve in the
future, all of which are outside the scope of this paper. A few interesting future directions
for this topic are more thorough analyses of housing as an investment that evolves over time
akin to Bayer et al. (2016), assessing the risks of cannabis consumption through psychological
addiction, and modeling how cities endogenously determine amenity provision.
The issues surrounding land-use regulation in the Washington State cannabis industry
are paramount not just for the states that are in the process of legalizing cannabis for
production and consumption, but for any setting in which land-use regulations affect market
structure 52 and are imposed with the goal of mitigating some kind of externality. Reconciling
the existence of nascent cannabis markets with the prevailing norms and beliefs of citizens
as it impacts facets such as urban planning and housing as an investment device is just one
of the new issues to be encountered when bringing a market from the shadows into the light.
52A salient, recent example is the role of short-term bans for Airbnb in residential zoning areas.
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Chapter 2
A Discrete-Choice Approach to Measuring
(Dis)amenity Value for Homebuyers
2.1 Introduction
The history of urban development in recent US history has been one of a tug of war
between those that seek more lax regulations to allow building and development, and those
that seek additional regulations to preserve their contemporaneous neighborhoods. Among
the former group, there are land developers, affordable housing advocates, and business
owners. Among the latter, homeowners and historical neighborhood associations. One recent
case study of the ubiquitous tension between development and preservation is the creation of
the recreational cannabis market in Washington State. The recreational cannabis legalization
referendum in Washington State included location restrictions on where cannabis retailers
could set up shop, and the main goal of these regulations was to minimize cannabis exposure
to minors.
A question of interest is measuring residents’ utility for cannabis retailers in light of
the potential exposure to minors, and how knowing these preferences can be used to design
optimal zoning policy for sin good businesses, which are desirable for local governments due to
the substantial tax revenues derived from them. This question is timely because many states
are considering legalizing and regulating the production and sales of recreational cannabis, so
devising sensible urban planning policy that does not handicap the industry is of first-order
importance.
In this paper, I measure homebuyers’ preferences toward cannabis retailer proximity
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to their homes and their nearby sensitive-use areas via a discrete-choice framework. I find
that, on average, people dislike having cannabis retailers near their homes and schools, but
that the impact is heterogeneous, mainly falling along a children- no children boundary,
with families with minors being the demographic most negatively impacted. I find that
relaxing location restrictions around sensitive-use areas from 1000 feet down to 100 feet
would decrease homebuyer surplus by about 65%. To conduct this exercise, I first estimate
a housing demand model, plug in the alternative locations for cannabis retailers obtained in
Larsen (2020b), and compute the resident surplus measures based on sorting on the intensive
margin of house purchasing decisions. The findings are qualitatively in line with the hedonic
method used to measure residents’ negative externalities in the aforementioned paper, but are
greater in magnitude since they allow for sorting while the previous work did not. Regardless
of the method and that sorting on the extensive margin is shut down 1, the harm from
allowing the market to expand beyond the status-quo allowed locations would not offset the
benefit that an expanded market brings to consumers.
Buying a house is one of the most important decisions an individual or household
will make in their life. There is generally a period of saving, searching, negotiating with
real estate agents, and the mortgage can last up to thirty years. Households submit an
application to be approved for a mortgage and the government monitors any potential acts
of discrimination toward homebuyers. The housing market is one that is characterized by
slow supply increases, numerous supply restrictions, and a pervasive desire by homeowners
to use their home as an investment vehicle, and ensuring their value goes up, not down.
For this last reason, incorporating disamenities near homes may lead to opposition by home
buyers and homeowners, since a decrease in the value of their typically largest investment
may take a long time to recoup. It has been argued that, at least for a substantial percentage
1Opening the extensive margin channel means allowing the housing supply decision to be endogenous
rather than fixed.
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of the population, cannabis retailers fall into the disamenity category, together with landfills,
high-crime areas, and industrial zones.
The insights gained from this exercise and the framework can be used to inform
both market design for current and future cannabis markets as well as any market or urban
amenity that may be imposing a negative externality on residents. Zoning and other land-
use policies considered by policymakers can be used in conjunction with more traditional
economic policies such as taxation and entry restrictions to devise markets that can make
the most number of agents satisfied while abating any negative impacts.
2.2 Contribution
2.2.1 Measuring Urban Amenities
First, I contribute to the urban economics literature on measuring urban amenities
and disamenities. Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007) develop a model to better estimate
residents’ preferences for amenities in urban areas by combining both a regression discon-
tinuity and a discrete-choice model to study to what extent residents value high-quality
schools, Greenstone, Hornbeck and Moretti (2010) use a hedonic model to measure the im-
pact of polluting energy plants on residents, and Sinha, Caulkins and Cropper (2018) com-
pare how hedonic and discrete-choice models perform in estimating residents’ preferences
toward amenities. Hedonic regression papers are only accurate in measuring the average
valuation for amenities, but in settings where the valuation for an amenity is heterogeneous,
other methods may be necessary for a more complete picture. Discrete-choice models that
measure amenitity values like Bayer can tackle the heterogeneity, but caution must be ex-
ercised when aggregating housing types. I develop a model of housing demand within a
discrete-choice framework to measure the heterogeneous impact of cannabis retailers, con-
sidered a disamenity to some people, on residents and find that residents living in areas with
mainly adults without children consider it an amenity and residents living in areas with
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adults with children consider it a disamenity. These findings can help inform policy that
aims to mitigate the negative externality that a cannabis retailer may impose on residents
by allowing retailers to locate far from areas with greater percentages of minors.
2.2.2 Zoning and Urban Planning Policy
I contribute to the urban economics literature on zoning and urban planning policy.
Recent work to measure the value of zoning on economic activity has Turner, Haughwout
and van der Klaauw (2014) studying land-use reform on the value of the usable land and
Shertzer, Twinam and Walsh (2018) studying how zoning has shaped long-term urban eco-
nomic activity (or lack thereof) on specific neighborhoods in Chicago. Cities across the world
face questions on where to allow certain businesses to operate and devise zoning and other
land-use regulations to study how a location restriction on cannabis retailers affects residents
and how alternative land-use policy can mitigate or exacerbate the externality this type of
business imposes on residents. I find that relaxing location restrictions around sensitive-use
areas from 1000 feet to 100 feet makes residents on average worse off by decreasing the resi-
dent surplus they obtain, but groups divided by whether they have children or not, measured
by the percentage of underage people in their census tract, face heterogeneous impacts. The
status quo restriction appears to mitigate a resident externality that is mostly perceived
by residents with minors, which is in line with the original purpose. When the economic
analysis of this project is tied with Larsen (2020b), I find that while the resident negative
externality is exacerbated under a more relaxed policy scenario, the positive effects of a
broader market more than outweigh the costs imposed on residents, if I assign equal weights
to each surplus measure. This means that if a policymaker were to treat residents’ and
consumers’ equally, the benefit of consumers would outweigh the concern of residents and
to justify the existing policy, more weight would have to be applied to residents. Generally,
local policymakers make policy decisions by assessing the existing cost-benefit analysis of
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a proposed policy under their set of preferences, and this analysis is supposed to provide
some insight into a land-use regulation that has become ubiquitous as more states legalized
cannabis for recreational purposes.
2.2.3 Intersection of Industrial Organization and Urban Economics
Second, I contribute to the growing body of empirical work at the intersection of
industrial organization and urban economics. Recent work by Calder-Wang (2020) studies
the heterogeneous impact that Airbnb had on the housing rental market by developing a
model of both long-term and short-term rental demand and supply, and finds that the losses
that residents perceive through increased rent prices are greater than the gains that the hosts
perceive from offering their units as Airbnbs. Almagro and Dominguez-Lino (2020) studies
the relationship between location sorting and how Airbnb hosts decide to provide short-term
rental in certain areas according to resident preferences. Nishida (2014) measures the costs
of zoning regulations for convenience stores in Japan and finds that absent the regulations,
there would be greater firm entry and sales. Other work in this intersection mainly studies
the impact of spatial differentiation on market outcomes, with papers like Orhun (2012),
Zhu and Singh (2009), Seim (2006), and Datta and Sudhir (2012). There is also work on
the relationship between zoning and competition with papers like Ridley, Sloan and Song
(2010) and Picone, Ridley and Zandbergen (2009). My contribution consists of taking a
discrete-choice framework from the empirical industrial organization literature and applying
it to a land-use policy concerning how residents value cannabis retailers near their homes
and schools. The model is static because the shops open up in a short period of time, so
unlike the Bayer et al. (2016) paper on dynamic housing supply, I focus on the short-run
valuation of properties.
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2.2.4 Impact of Cannabis Markets
Lastly, I contribute to the recent literature on the impact of cannabis markets on
broader economic outcomes. Cannabis has been touted as an important source of tax revenue
for states due to the widely used nature of the drug but no legal market from which to extract
taxes. Hollenbeck and Uetake (2021) study the link between tax rates and firms’ price-setting
power in the Washington State cannabis industry and find that the current 37% tax rate is
lower than optimal from the point of view of a tax revenue maximizing policymaker. Their
work is particularly important since it studies questions of pass-through and taxation in a
scenario with local monopolists with substantial price-setting power. On the other side of the
political spectrum, communities have been long concerned about facilitating drug exposure
to minors, and Thomas and Tian (2019) find, through a hedonic framework, that property
values fall by about 5% when a cannabis retailer opens near residents’ homes. While Larsen
(2020b) expands on Thomas and Tian (2019)’s hedonic modeling to include other sensitive-
use areas and models the industry’s market structure, this project studies the same question
under a discrete-choice framework, which can provide insight into the potential heterogenous
impact of nearby cannabis retailers.
2.3 Data
I combine data from various sources to obtain a sample of the houses purchased,
information on homebuyers, election results, and neighborhood and housing characteristics.
The backbone of the analytical sample is the King County Tax Assessor Property Sales
Data, which has information on all sold properties in King County. This dataset includes
property sold price, property characteristics such as number of bedrooms, number of bath-
rooms, square feet, and a tax-assessor-provided grade of quality. The data only provides the
address of the parcel, so I geocode the properties’ addresses using the Texas A&M Geocoding
Services to obtain the latitudes and longitudes. First, I conduct an exploration of classifying
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properties into housing types. It is not clear ex-ante how to split up housing or if the Calder-
Wang (2020) method is satisfactory for my setting. Her data is from New York City, which
has more housing than King County, so I must use fewer variables to avoid extremely small
market shares. I classify properties according to 27 housing types, based on three housing
characteristics: three tiers of square footage, three tiers of number of bedrooms, and three
tiers of quality grade. I then aggregate the data up to the year-census tract-housing type
level, the level of observation used for the empirical section of the paper.
Since the paper aims to measure the externality that cannabis retailers impose on
residents by measuring residents’ choices in property through changes in property values and
the best available data is property sales data, I model homebuyers’ decisions to purchase
a property. To achieve this, I use data from the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act, which
includes information on all individuals to apply for a mortgage and features applicants’
income, race, and census tract. I use data from the 2014 ACS to gather information on the
properties’ neighborhood characteristics and the homebuyers’ neighborhood characteristics.
I also augment homebuyers’ and neighborhoods information with the i-502 referendum results
to measure attitudes toward cannabis legalization. Finally, I generate distances between
census tract centroids and nearby cannabis retailers.
2.4 Model
2.4.1 Housing Demand
I adapt the long-term rental housing demand model from Calder-Wang (2019) to my
current setting of long-term home buyer demand.
2.4.1.1 Market Definition
A prospective homebuyer considers to make a discrete choice from several housing
types in a number of nearby neighborhoods. Each type of house h is characterized by the
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neighborhood n, a census tract, where the property is located, by its physical characteristics
such as the number of bathrooms and bedrooms, the property’s age in terms of the decade
built, and tax assessors’ measures of the type and quality. Within each type h, there are Nh
units that are equal up to an idiosyncratic shock εi,j.
Since there is only a median of about 12 miles between the homes that recent home
buyers purchased and the homes they moved from, I assume home buyers consider housing
types in neighborhoods within 10 miles of their neighborhood n. This effectively creates
choice sets for home buyers. A home buyer’s choice set is defined as Bi = {(h, n)|dninh ≤ ri}
where dninh is the distance between the population-weighted centroid for homebuyer i’s
neighborhood ni and the housing type h’s neighborhood nh, and ri = 10 is the maximum
distance they are willing to search in miles. For smaller cities, this mostly encompasses the
entire urban area and for bigger cities, it encompasses a substantial percentage of the urban
area.
2.4.1.2 Model Specification
The utility of home buyer i from purchasing a property j of housing type h is:
ui,j = αiph + βiXh + ξh + εi,j (2.1)
where ph is the average price of housing type h, Xh includes physical characteristics
such as number of bedrooms, number of bathrooms, sq ft, building age, building type,
condition 2 and neighborhood characteristics such as census-tract-level i-502 referendum
results, percentage of college-educated households, race percentages, income, and proximity
to nearest retailer, to nearest sensitive-use area (SUA), and between the assigned SUA and
the SUA’s nearest retailer. There is also a demand-side term ξh that home buyers observes
2An official designation of quality given by the tax assessor.
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but that the econometrician does not. Finally, each individual receives a type I extreme
value error εi,j.
For demographic characteristics of home buyers, I use data from theHome Mortgage
Disclosure Act, which includes the race, income, and census tract of the individuals 3 that
request a mortgage. I also complement this dataset with other census-tract demographic
characteristics from the ACS data, especially the number of children and percentage of
families with children in the home buyer’s census tract.
Each home buyer i purchases a property j by maximizing her utility by comparing
all available options :
yi = j ⇐⇒ ui,j > ui,−j (2.2)
The group of home buyers that purchase type h is the group of home buyers that




{zi, εi,· : ui,j > ui,−j} (2.3)
The demand for property types h is calculated by summing up the home buyers that




dP (ε)dP ∗D(z) (2.4)
with P ∗D being the distribution of demographic variables of home buyers.
2.4.2 Housing Supply
Supply of housing types is fixed at Nh. The prices clear according to this fixed supply:
3I use the census tract where mortgage applicants resided at the time of applying for a mortgage.
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∀h : DLh (pLh , pL−h) = Nh (2.5)
Nh is the number of properties that were sold for a particular housing type-census
tract-year. The outside option is to stay at their current location and not purchase a house.
The fixed supply assumption means that if we conduct a counterfactual policy that leads
people to choose different housing, the endogenous sorting process on the intensive margin
4 means that prices will adjust so that the market clears.
The data used is almost identical in nature to the data used in Bayer et al (2016). A
key distinction from the literature is that I assume the supply of housing is the housing that
is available for sale, not the entire supply of housing. This is in line with the goals of the
paper and with the data limitations: modeling decisions for homebuyers 5, not renters, and
using the property sales data. Assuming the latter would require either including renters
as ‘consumers’, which would lead to extremely small market shares and thus make the
estimation unstable. I model the characteristics of prospective homebuyers from the set of
mortgage applicants in the HMDA data and restrict the available housing to the houses that
sold each month. Thus, the market clears in the model.
2.5 Housing Demand Estimation
The estimation procedure broadly follows Calder-Wang (2020), which follows (Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes, 1995), Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (2004), and Bayer, Ferreira and
McMillan (2007). Data on housing types market shares construct macro moments, which
4By intensive margin, I mean that home buyers may choose more of one specific housing type, even if the
number of properties in a housing type remains fixed. The extensive margin in this exercise would be more
housing being offered by home sellers and more home buyers than was observed in the data, something that
is outside the scope of this paper.
5The idea is that homebuyers arguably drive price changes due to disamenities, due to sorting, more than
renters.
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exploit the information on how home buyers substitute housing types. Data on demographic
characteristics construct micro moments, which exploit the information in the similarity in
demographic characteristics between home buyers’ home census tract and the purchased
home’s census tract. First, I estimate the individual-level coefficients by exploiting the
census-tract-level mortgage data. Second, I obtain the linear coefficients.
The utility can be broken down into two parts: one common to all home buyers and
one specific to each home buyer i, which is a function of observables z.
The mean utility from housing type h is:
δh = αph + βXh + ξh (2.6)








where zp,i,k is home buyer i’s race, income, and whether he/she has children, zx,i,k is
the percentage of underage people in the home buyer’s census tract, and Xh includes the
distance variables from the census tract centroid to the nearest retailer and from the census
tract’s assigned school to its nearest retailer.
Let Nh be the number of properties for sale of type h. If the idiosyncratic shock ε is
i.i.d. TIEV, we can construct the choice probabilities for home buyers:
Pr(yi ∈ h; δh, π) =
Nhexp(δh + λi,h)∑
h′ Nh′exp(δh′ + λi,h′)
(2.8)
2.5.1 Constructing Moments and the Objective Function
First, I define moments to identify the mean values δ and the individual-level coeffi-
cients π. I have purchase choices at the individual-level, so I construct 1{yi∈h}, which allows
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me to construct moments that match the market shares at the housing type-census-tract
level sh. In addition, I construct moments which equate the covariance of the property char-
acteristics Xb,h and the mean demographic characteristics zk of home buyers that purchase
h. For example, I equate the covariance of the square footage and the mean income of home
buyers that purchase housing types with similar square footage. The moments that identify
δ and π are:
∀h : E[Pr(yi ∈ h; δ, π)] = sh (2.9)
∀b, k : Cov(E[zk|yi ∈ h; δ, π], Xb,h) = Cov(z̄k,h, Xb,h) (2.10)














h′ Nh′ . I match the model market shares to market shares observed in
the data to back out the mean utility δ via the usual BLP contraction mapping:
δn+1 = δn + ln(s)− ln(ŝ(δn)) (2.12)
Equation (2.9) means the model is supposed to match model market shares with
observed market shares. The left-hand side is the probability that a homebuyer in census
tract i purchases a property of type h, averaged over all the homebuyers in census tract i. To
provide intuition on Equation (2.9), suppose a homebuyer has to decide between 5 houses,
3 of type A and 2 of type B. Further, suppose that the mean utilities for both types is the
same, δA = δB. Suppose the homebuyer chooses a house of type A. Then, any differences
in market shares should come from the preferences of the homebuyer in the census tract
i for the individual-specific terms λi,h and the supply of housing types that multiplies the
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exponentiated term. In fact, even if the entire base utilities for household i were the same,
i.e. δh + λi,h = δh′ + λi,h′ , ∀i, the difference in market shares will be driven by differences in
housing types fixed supply 6. The same idea applies for the covariance moments.
Second, I construct the moment conditions that allow me to identify the linear pa-
rameters α, β, and the unobservable ξh. The market price ph may be correlated with the
unobservable ξh, so I use an instrument that exploits the housing characteristics space as in
Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007) and Calder-Wang (2020). The instrument consists of
employing the property characteristics of similar properties in different neighborhoods. To
measure the effect of housing characteristics on market price, I calculate new property prices
by setting ξh = 0 and allowing the market-clearing equations for housing types to provide
the alternative market shares. The moments are:
∀h : E[Pr(y ∈ h; (pIV , α, β, ξ = 0, π,Xexog))] = sh (2.13)
∀h : E[Pr(y ∈ h; (p, α, β, ξ, π,X))] = sh (2.14)
E[pIVXexog] = 0 (2.15)
E[ξXexog] = 0 (2.16)
Constructing the alternative equilibrium price pIV requires a supply-side pricing equation.
Since this context features a fixed housing supply, the supply-side pricing equation is a
market-clearing condition for all housing types. For each α, β, ξ, there exists a corresponding
pIV .
6Note that I am imposing market clearing for housing and that housing supply is fixed. As a thought
exercise, suppose there is a single homebuyer in census tract i and that its base utilities (except logit errors)
are identical for all its housing choices. Then, other homebuyers from other census tracts should have access
to these 5 houses as well, such that the market clears. I do not currently allow fewer buyers than the number
of available homes. An implicit assumption is that if that were the case, then the price should adjust to
become an attractive option to other homebuyers. I allow potentially more buyers, and the difference is
absorbed by the outside option. More details about the construction of the market share moments can be
found in Calder-Wang (2020) and Berry, Levinsohn and Pakes (2004).
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To obtain identification, I need that certain property characteristics Xexog be inde-
pendent from the unobservable term ξ:
ξ ⊥ Xexog (2.17)
pIV is obtained by making ξ = 0, pIV is by definition uncorrelated with ξ. The
challenge in this context is to find certain property characteristics that are plausibly inde-
pendent from ξ. Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007) suggest using a set of unchangeable
characteristics of the total available properties like the number of bathrooms, number of bed-
rooms, building type, building age, etc. I exclude neighborhood demographics since these
may be correlated with unobserved quality. The alternative price is obtained by resolving
the market-clearing condition with only Xexog.
The demand coefficients and the price instrument are estimated jointly. The popula-




 = 0 (2.18)
The GMM estimator is obtained by the expression:
θ̂ = argminθĜ(θ)
′Â−1Ĝ(θ) (2.19)
where Ĝ(θ) and Â are the sample analogues to G(θ) and A, respectively, and A is the
moments’ variance-covariance matrix. Â is obtained with a 2-step procedure.
2.5.2 Caveats and Limitations
I describe a few caveats to the exercise conducted in the paper. First, I assume no
dynamics, which may be important when considering housing as an investment as Bayer et al.
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(2016) studies. Since the rise of cannabis retailers in Washington occurred over a short period
of time, I use the changes in property values over a short time period to measure residents’
attitudes. Using sales from before and after the market started, I can measure how property
values capture residents’ attitudes toward the existence and location of cannabis retailers
and since a property is an asset, I can safely assume that the price reflects changes in its
desirability and any changes are priced in as soon as they occur. I am assuming all dynamics
in housing as an investment enters the housing sale price.
Second, housing transactions data may not be fully representative of the full sample
of homeowners/residents. This may be not as innocous if renters also have an outsize impact
on property values, or if their attitudes are markedly different from home buyers’ attitudes.
I lack the data to study renters’ attitudes or how rent prices change due to this policy
change. If we assume renters’ preferences are exactly those of home buyers’ preferences
toward cannabis retailers, we could apply the results from this paper to all housing in King
County.
Third, while I allow homebuyers to potentially choose a different housing type in
counterfactual policy scenarios, I can’t predict whether more or fewer homes may become
available for sale. Thus, I am only able to capture changes on the intensive margin. Allowing
more housing supply to become available is outside the scope of the current study but is a
fruitful avenue for future research.
2.6 Results
I provide point estimates of the estimation procedure outlined in the previous section
7.
7Standard errors will be provided in a future iteration of this project.
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Distance Bin Home Retailer 0.576
Distance Bin Retailer School 0.629
Log Pop Den −0.387
Underage −2.482
Πβ,1 (Dist Home Ret * Underage) −2.412
Πβ,2 (Dist Ret School * Underage) −3.374
Πα,1 (Price*ShareWhite) 0.8673
Πα,2 (Price*Median Income) 1.6724
Πα,3 (Price*ShareYesVote) −0.531
The signs of the point estimates are economically significant and make qualitative
sense: people dislike higher prices, like more square footage, like more quality, and dislike
denser areas. Regarding preferences toward cannabis retailers, people appear to like being
close to a cannabis retailer if they do not have any children, but greatly dislike living near
them if they do have children. The same pattern applies regarding living in an area where
a cannabis retailer is near its assigned school. Demand becomes steeper as median income
increases, which is consistent with the idea that richer home buyers prefer high-value housing.
Using the average number of underage people in a census tract, the effect of having nearby
cannabis retailers is negative, which is consistent with Larsen (2020b)’s hedonic results. The
key difference between the hedonic analysis and the present analysis is that the demand
estimates interpret home buyers’ preferences beyond the price, which allow us to get a more
complete picture of what heterogeneous home buyers like and dislike. The estimates appear
to confirm what was discussed with real estate agents in the Seattle area: adults with children
appear to be the demographic most concerned with cannabis retailer presence and may be
the group most likely to perceive them as disamenities and move elsewhere. Adults without
children, on the other hand, may perceive cannabis retailers as an amenity and value living
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close to one, and be indifferent toward having a cannabis retailer near their assigned schools.
2.7 Counterfactual Policy
In this section, I calculate the surplus that homebuyers obtain from the existing
housing stock, and how this surplus changes when I consider the counterfactual policy of
new cannabis retailer locations from relaxing the buffers around sensitive-use areas to 100
feet. I compute resident surplus via the familiar log sum formula. Note that in contrast
with the hedonic resident externalities, in this exercise residents perceive a surplus from
purchasing a property, but may receive a lower surplus than otherwise if they purchase near
a disamenity.
Table 2.2: Counterfactual: Relaxing Location Restrictions to 100 ft, King County
Baseline CF % Change
Resident Surplus ($) 18,321,859.3 6,350,245.4 -65.34
Table 2 shows the decrease in resident surplus from having cannabis retailers closer
to homes and schools. Surplus decreases by roughly 65% and judging by the estimates, most
of this decrease is driven mainly by increased retailer proximity to sensitive-use areas and
increased retailer proximity to dense areas 8, which is where most people live and where
most of the available housing stock is.
This surplus decrease is larger than the resident externality increase calculated from
hedonic estimates in Larsen (2020b), which is consistent with the fact that the present
exercise allows for homebuyers deciding to choose other housing when a certain area becomes
too close to a retailer for their preferences. I would expect a future counterfactual exercise
8Cannabis retailers locating in dense areas is better for business but affects more residents.
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that allows sorting on the extensive margin to have even larger impacts. However, whether
resident externalities can outweigh the benefits of the market to consumers still appears
unlikely. Policymakers could in principle use this framework and results to craft policy but
the final decision should be determined by what the policymakers decide is more important
for the city, and that decision may involve placing different weights on market and residents
than weighing them equally.
2.8 Discussion
This paper is an empirical exercise to more thoroughly measure how people perceive
a potential disamenity. Absent detailed survey data on Washington State citizens or more
accurate measurements on how people felt toward the opening of cannabis retailers near
their neigborhoods, I employ a discrete-choice approach to measure homebuyers’ preferences
in housing purchases near the beginning of the cannabis market. This approach allows me to
measure heterogeneous preferences toward the proximity of cannabis retailers to homes and
to their nearest schools. In addition, the exercise allows for endogenous sorting of homebuyers
as retailers move closer to sensitive-use areas due to more relaxed policies. Without a model,
any counterfactual outcome would ignore crucial sorting patterns of people and subsequent
changes in price and housing availability. In this exercise, I open the sorting channel on the
intensive margin by developing a model of homebuyer demand.
I compute resident surplus under the 2014 policy and under the counterfactual policy
of relaxing location restrictions of cannabis retailers from sensitive-use areas down to 100
feet and find that resident surplus decreases by 65% when cannabis retailers are allowed to
lcoate up to 100 feet away from sensitive-use areas, which opens up more locations for firms
to open their establishments but are now closer to where more people live and closer to
their assigned schools. The impact is heterogeneous and most negatively affects homebuyers
from census tracts with greater percentage of underage people, i.e. areas with families
91
with children. Homebuyers from areas with very small percentage of underage people, i.e.
areas with adults without children, appear to perceive cannabis retailers as an amenity. On
average, however, the impact is negative.
I list a few potential fruitful avenues for future research on measuring resident exter-
nalities. First, it is not clear how to aggregate housing so that current cutting-edge models
of housing demand can perform satisfactorily. A method that is more streamlined and relies
less of heuristics would be very useful to more easily apply off-the-shelf models to study
housing demand. A rich enough dataset would be able to tell the researcher to what ex-
tent consumers perceive choices as substitutes, but the existing property sales data does not
appear to be as rich to permit this.
Second, incorporating a model of housing supply would allow the researcher to mea-
sure sorting on the extensive margin. I currently allow sorting on the intensive margin but
rely on fixed housing supply. Having additional data on the existing stock of housing and
compare the existing total with the stock used for renting and the stock used for selling
would lead to a model where homeowners decide to put their homes for sale if a disamenity
appears close to their property and threatens to devalue its worth.
A third area of fruitful work is in comparing and contrasting homeowner preferences
from renter preferences. I only have property sales data and since it is not clear how different
these two sets of preferences are, I abstain from including the set of renters into the exercise.
While one could argue that renters also perceive cannabis retailers as disamenities, it is not
clear how differently they perceive price, and the calculus to both calculate and reconcile




Continuity and Change: The Role of Consumer
Demand versus Inertia in Vertical Relationship
Formations in a New Market
3.1 Introduction
How does a new market evolve? Which economic forces are important for the equi-
librium of a market, and which are not? The dearth of new markets and the lack of data
availability to analyze them from such early stages generally does not allow researchers to
answer these types of research questions. This project has both features, which allow me to
study how firms are subject to consumer demand forces and inertia when it comes to building
relationships with suppliers and understanding their customer base. I also investigate how
upstream and downstream firms coordinate supply decisions in vertically separated markets
and which motives may drive the observed sorting patterns: in the Washington state recre-
ational cannabis industry, producers appear to trade almost exclusively with at most one or
two retailers in any given county. I provide a model of consumer and retailer endogenous
response with link formation frictions that aims to provide structure for the economic forces
at hand and to guide the empirical analyses.
Using comprehensive data on firm transfers, I answer the following questions: (1)
do vertical relationships exhibit structural state dependence and if so, why? and (2) which
economic forces are most important for retailers when approaching an equilibrium? The first
question aims to test whether the observed sorting patterns occur out of state dependence
with past trades or if the observed correlations are spurious or due to unobserved hetero-
geneity. Being able to discern between the two factors is crucial to understand whether firms
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obtain some value from the observed sorting patterns or if they enter into these arrangements
merely out of randomness. The second question tests the degree to which consumer demand
responses and inertia guide retailers’ decisions as the market matures. I find that, first,
vertical sorting patterns exhibit substantial structural state dependence over time. Second,
structural state dependence is mostly present at the beginning of the market and retailers’
responses to consumer demand become more important as the market matures.
The results presented in this paper suggest that, in the presence of downstream buyer
power, producers opt for long-term contracts to ensure a distribution channel until they do
not have any more incentive to continue. Since there are almost twice as many producers as
there are retailers, retailers can decide which producers to buy from. Thus, producers must
offer deals that are favorable to the buyer. Producers face a trade-off between maintaining
a long-term trading arrangement with a retailer that will buy from them in the future and
searching for other retailers that may buy at higher rates. In the presence of few downstream
buyers, producers opt for ensuring a distribution channel by selling to the same retailer.
When the retailer landscape changes, it is not immediately clear a priori how the
existing arrangements will change. On the one hand, they now have new retailers to sell
their product to, so they do not have to rely as much on previous trading partners. On the
other hand, there may not be as big of an incentive to switch if there are already efficiency
gains from contracting with the previous trading partner. In this setting, the stability that
producers gain from knowing a retailer will buy their product in such a competitive upstream
market might cause them to stay put. In addition, large producers may be more able to
satisfy product demand from new retailers than small producers. Small producers may
be more likely to maintain the existing long-term contracts. Since theory alone does not
authoritatively answer these questions, I take an empirical approach.
When more retailers enter the downstream market, the retailers’ buyer power de-
creases since now producers have more outlets to sell their product. Producers are no longer
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obligated to continue offering favorable deals to the old retailer to maintain the relationship
since now they can sell their product to a new retailer for potentially higher profits. When
it comes to market outcomes, there are two countervailing forces at work. First, retailers
may pay more for inventory as their buyer power decreases and producers have more outlets
for distribution, leading to higher prices for consumers. Second, retailers obtain less profit
from a more competitive downstream environment due to more retailers. I thus expect the
distribution of profits to shift from retailers to producers as more retailers enter the market.
The effects on consumer welfare are not a priori clear.
In vertically separated markets, the incentives of upstream and downstream firms may
not be perfectly aligned. Moreover, in this industry, there are more producers than retailers
and producers vary by size, meaning some firms have more influence over others. To ensure
a stable distribution channel, producers may have an incentive to become close with one
retailer instead of searching each period for a buyer. In this industry, most producers trade
80 percent or more of their inventory to one or at most two retailers in any county. Instead
of serving another retailer in a given county, conditional on already serving one retailer in
that county, the producer prefers to serve a first retailer in a different county. For a non-
negligible percentage of producers, this pattern exceeds 95 percent of their inventory in any
given county so in all aspects but literal, these firms act as if they were vertically integrated.
This kind of time-invariant arrangement may solve bargaining inefficiencies and may act as
a coordinate substitute for vertical integration.
The questions raised in this paper are important because one of the mandates of the
WLCB is to regulate the cannabis market. The Board faces a trade-off between allowing firms
to freely enter the market and have potentially excessive cannabis consumption and ensuring
firms can flourish enough to keep the black market at bay. Its market design rules were also
influenced by the alcohol laws, which after Prohibition, aimed to avoid the domination of
the market by a few large firms through tied houses. It is important to understand how
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cannabis producers and retailers interact if the states are going to enact policies that aim to
achieve specific market outcomes such as maintaining a certain level of consumption while
warding off the black market with reasonable prices. Looking at the vertical arrangements in
this industry is particularly important since there has been substantial debate on how these
markets should be designed: for example, Colorado allows full vertical integration whereas
Washington does not allow integration down to the retailer level. More states are following
the steps of the early-adopter states so understanding the role of vertical arrangements in
Washington State can guide future policy. Ultimately, regulators care about how the firms’
arrangements may impact market outcomes, so it is important to understand why firms
exhibit the observed patterns and use this information to guide policy recommendations.
At the same time, the insights obtained from finding causal state dependence in vertical
relationships can guide policy in any setting where vertical relationships play an important
role.
In the absence of formal contracts, vertical arrangements are maintained if the market
structure provides an incentive to do so and if there are frictions that are difficult to undo.
If the market structure changes, it is not obvious whether and to what extent the existing
vertical arrangements will continue to exist. The novel aspect in this project is that I examine
the nature of vertical arrangements by observing sorting patterns for the universe of firm-to-
firm transactions in the industry: there is no evidence of formal contracts, yet firms appear
to derive some gain from maintaining a long-term relationship. I investigate the reasons why
firms choose to enter vertical arrangements, the robustness of vertical contracts, and how
these decisions affect market outcomes.
3.2 Related Literature
While there is a wide-ranging theoretical literature on vertical relationships, there is
relatively little empirical research on the effect of market structure on vertical arrangements,
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despite their importance and their ubiquitous nature. Two persistent problems in the lit-
erature are lack of access to widespread supply-chain data and the endogeneity of contract
formation: this project can address both issues.
First, I have data on an entire industry’s supply chain. The Traceability dataset
offers one of the most comprehensive looks into an industry’s supply chain in the empirical
industrial organization literature: I observe all firms in the Washington State recreational
cannabis market, all transactions (firm-to-firm and sales), and detailed information on these
transactions. Hansen, Miller and Weber (2020) were the first to use the transfers dataset to
measure the impact of a tax reform on vertical structures. The Traceability dataset allows
me to take a comprehensive look into vertical relationships in a way that was previously not
possible.
Second, to tackle the endogeneity problem, researchers have generally followed two
main approaches. First, researchers in the past have exploited the timing of the adoption of
contracts as a source of exogeneity and looked at its impact on market outcomes. The second
approach is generally to develop a structural model of the relevant economic forces, estimate
it with existing contract data and relying on plausibly exogenous variation that can identify
parameters, and conduct counterfactuals to investigate potential market outcomes. This
paper studies issues often present in the first approach, which is that the act of entering into a
contract is generally endogenous: if a firm enters into a contract, it must be because choosing
to contract yields a higher expected payoff than not contracting. My main contribution is
to exploit a novel dataset and a market reform that provided exogenous variation in trading
patterns to uncover how changes in market structure affected existing vertical relations,
namely how firms form or change their vertical relationships over time.
This paper is related to several strands in the vertical relationships literature, namely
the vast theoretical literature and the relatively thinner empirical literatures on incentive
alignments, exclusive arrangements, and bundling.
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3.2.1 IO Theory
Different stories may motivate why firms enter into contracts. Matouschek and
Ramezzana (2007) show how, depending on market conditions, agents may adopt exclu-
sive contracts to reduce bargaining inefficiencies in the presence of private information.
Transaction-cost arguments for vertical integration by Williamson (1998) come to mind,
in which he points out that firms have incentives to vertically integrate if they foresee future
disputes with other parties. In my setting, the large number of upstream firms may moti-
vate producers to choose one retailer to exclusively trade with rather than to compete with
the other producers in search of an outlet for their product. While these theoretical results
may explain why the observed sorting patterns in the data are so stark, the results seem to
suggest that the driving motives are producers’ desire to secure a distribution channel and
retailers’ buyer power.
Williamson (1998) states that one of the critical dimensions to analyze transactions
is uncertainty. Producers have an incentive to eliminate this uncertainty by either securing
long-term relationships with retailers, or if they could, vertically integrate with a retailer or
sell directly to consumers. So, if there is one thing that in this market firms would want to
bring under internal organization, it is the demand uncertainty that producers face. Since
the regulator does not allow vertical integration, a feasible alternative is to either form long-
term contracts or develop a brand that consumers are familiar with in specific stores. This
project measures the ways in which firms respond to the uncertainty in the market and how
these responses change as the market matures and the uncertainty decreases.
3.2.2 Contracts and Incentive Alignments
Work on contract duration like Mackay (2017) comes conceptually close to my project,
in which he analyzes the transaction costs of re-selecting a supplier and the cost of being
matched to an inefficient supplier when the relationship lasts too long. Mackay’s paper is
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akin to my project in the sense that information on buyer-supplier contracts are rare to
obtain and his paper examines the incentives behind contract formation. One difference
is that in his case, the buyer is fixed, the federal government, whereas in my market the
downstream is oligopolistic and is subject to state regulations that alter its structure. This
distinction will lead to differences in how firms behave. While I do not plan to go down
the transaction costs route, I do consider the trade-offs that a supplier faces in the face of
uncertainty when securing a buyer.
Mortimer (2008) studies the empirical effects of revenue-sharing contracts on firms’
profits and consumer welfare in the video rental industry. She takes a structural approach
after showing preliminary regressions of revenue-sharing contracts on retailer profits and
shows how revenue-sharing contracts increase both upstream and downstream profits. In
that industry, contracts between distributors and retailers arise out of the ability to mon-
itor compliance through technological innovation. While my project also looks at vertical
arrangements aligning firms’ incentives, the reasons for why these arrangements arise and
their effects are very different. One of the main empirical issues in the vertical arrangements
literature is that contracts are endogenous by design, so it is difficult to isolate effects without
a source of exogenous variation. I take a reduced-form approach to investigate what drives
firms to engage in long-term contracts and to what extent, as market structure changes,
firms find it useful to remain in these long-term arrangements.
3.2.3 Vertical Integration
Atalay, Hortaçsu and Syverson (2014) investigate firms’ ownership of production
chains to understand the effects of vertical integration. They use Census data, which features
broad-based commodity flows across firms in various industries, and find that rather than
facilitating transfers of goods, integration promotes efficient transfers of intangible inputs.
While they focus on the role of integration within firms, I focus on the role of arrangements
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in a market where finding a buyer requires competing with many other firms. My setting
does not allow integration but the observed arrangements, as a way for producers to secure
a buyer, may have similar downstream effects as vertical integration.
Crawford et al. (2018) develop a structural framework for the analysis of vertical
integration and use it to examine the welfare effects of vertical integration in the cable
industry. There are two main distinctions from this paper. First, integration is not allowed
in my setting: this leads to different incentives to develop sorting patterns. Second, a market
reform provides exogenous variation on firms’ sorting patterns, allowing me to impose less
structure.
3.2.4 Exclusive Dealings
Asker (2016) evaluates the effect of exclusive dealing arrangements on competition
in the Chicago beer market. While the arrangements I observe are the opposite of those
in Asker and foreclosure is not a large concern in my setting, the observed sorting patterns
may suggest a softening of upstream competition. While I also examine the effects of vertical
arrangements on market outcomes, he looks at the arrangements in equilibrium, whereas I
check whether they are robust to a change in the market structure.
Asker and Ljungqvist (2010) use bank mergers as plausibly exogenous variation to find
that the apparent disinclination for firms to share underwriters has an impact on investment.
In their setting, firms avoid sharing underwriters due to a demand for secrecy, so it is
expected that the sorting patterns will remain unchanged. In my setting, however, the
strategic incentives to maintain the same trading partner may disappear after the retailer
license expansion. The main difference from their paper is that they assume the bank mergers
are exogenous, whereas my variation stems from retailer entry after a reform unexpectedly
expanded the number of possible licenses and from unexpected timing in actual entry from
already licensed firms.
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3.2.5 Firm Dynamics in a New Market
Another literature I contribute has to do with firm dynamics and how firms behave
in a new market. Drawing inspiration from Doraszelski, Lewis and Pakes (2018) which
measures learning in the new deregulated frequency response electricity market in the UK
and from Huang, Ellickson and Lovett (2021) which measures how retailers learn to price
liquor in the WA liquor market, I plan to measure consumer demand response at the retailer
level of consumer demand and producers’ quality in the new WA recreational cannabis
market. Escudero (2018), similarly as in Huang, Ellickson and Lovett (2021), shows that
prices in the WA cannabis market converge to a 50% markup, so firms are not setting
prices as best responses to their competitive environment. I measure which firms retailers
choose to trade with and the performance of new firms that act as producers based on
what consumers demand. It is important to know whether markets get stuck in vertical
relationships composed of firms with low performance due to high inertia, or whether markets
reach a state with vertical relationships composed of firms with high performance due to
retailers being in tune with consumers.
There is a wide literature about learning about prices and how prices converge to an
equilibrium point, but not as much about other economic agents’ quality or about optimal
trading partners. The closest analog to this project is Osborne (2010), which measures
learning and inertia at the consumer level for new products. Huang, Ellickson and Lovett
(2021) document how retailers learn how to price liquor products upon deregulation and
entry of new, private retailers. Escudero (2018), however, finds no learning of price-setting
in my market and instead finds convergence toward rule-of-thumb pricing. Even if in this
setting retailers are not pricing ‘optimally’, they might be listening to consumer demand and
deciding which producer to trade with based on sales performance. To my knowledge, this
is the first project to empirically test consumer demand responses and inertia at the supply
chain level in a new market.
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3.2.6 Vertical Relationships and Networks
The next literature to which this project contributes is the vertical relationships and
networks literature. In a new market with new retailers, new producers, and new products,
there is plenty of incomplete information and retailers and producers form links without
having full information. Since we observe all vertical sorting patterns, we can learn a great
deal about how an industry’s vertical sorting patterns materialize and change over time.
The asymmetry between retailers and producers in this market creates some interesting
patterns: since there are more producers than retailers and some producers are much bigger
in output/canopy size than others, this creates a prevailing uncertainty on whether producers
can secure shelf space from retailers to sell their product. This leads producers to mostly
sell to very few retailers, which resembles a semi-exclusive dealing situation. This is done
to accomplish demand assurance for producers. Retailers have substantial bargaining power
over producers and have market power at the retail level. The novel component here is
examine the trading patterns between retailers and producers in a setting where vertical
integration is not allowed, and what these firms do in the absence of VI.
3.2.7 Boundary of the Firm
Lastly, I contribute to the body of work regarding the boundary of the firm. This
literature generally concerns itself with questions such as what do firms do when they cannot
bring actions into their internal organization, and is it an efficient allocation of resources?
What aspect of vertical relationships would then be brought under internal organization?
Coase (1937) makes the distinction between market versus internal organization, but the
regulator here only allows the use of the market. It gives us a unique glimpse at what
the ‘market’ can achieve without internal organizations. Gibbons (2005) formalizes what it
means to be a firm in four different ways, some of which are alluded to in this paper. Other
papers that empirically test the boundary of the firm are Baker and Hubbard (2003) and
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Garicano and Hubbard (2003).
3.3 Institutional Background
3.3.1 Retailer License Reform
The reform I exploit for my analysis was announced as a precautionary measure to
ensure the recreational and medical markets could successfully merge starting July 2016.
The merging of the markets meant that the medical dispensaries would need to acquire a
recreational retailer license, and to sell medical cannabis, firms had to apply for a medical
marijuana endorsement (MMJ). In practice, virtually all firms, medical or recreational, that
applied for an MMJ received one. Prior to the merge, the medical market was mostly
unregulated: there were no license quotas on retailers, retailers could grow their own product,
and there was no product tracking. To properly merge the two sectors, the WLCB followed
the advice of a consulting company and unexpectedly announced on December 15th, 2015
that, starting January 6th, 2016, it would increase the number of statewide licenses from
339 to 556. Table 1 shows how the number of available licenses changed across markets.
The recreational license expansion varied by jurisdiction and it was determined based on the
number of medical sales in each county. The top 10 counties received a 100 percent increase
in the number of allowed licenses and the remaining counties received a 75 percent increase.
Four counties had a ban or moratorium on medical dispensaries, so they did not
receive a recreational retailer license expansion. This detail is key for the treatment-control
analysis: counties that did not receive a recreational retailer license expansion were not
given one for reasons unrelated to their performance in the recreational market. This allows
me to assign the counties/jurisdictions with a ban and moratoria as control groups without
concerns that the decision to not grant them an expansion was due to a lack of performance.
It is not immediately easy for consumers to substitute between medical and recreational
products as they need to obtain a license from a physician. The literature on cannabis treats
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Table 3.1: Change in Number of Retailer Licenses Across Markets
A. Firms (county markets)
Average Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Max
# (overall, before) 8.6 1 2 5 10 18 61
# (overall, after) 14.3 2 3 7 14 33 114
B. Firms (jurisdiction markets)
Average Q10 Q25 Q50 Q75 Q90 Max
# (overall, before) 2.2 1 1 2 3 6 21
# (overall, after) 4.5 1 2 3 5 9.6 42
(a) This table shows the distribution for the number of allowed licenses before and after the retailer
license reform in the state of Washington. Panel A shows the number of retailer licenses when mar-
kets are counties and Panel B shows the number of retailer licenses when markets are jurisdictions.
For reference, in all rows, the market with the most licenses includes the city of Seattle.
these sectors as separate markets. Beyond the counties that had a ban or moratoria, several
jurisdictions within treatment counties had a ban or moratoria so these jurisdictions were
not given an expansion either. I can in principle run our analysis on two different levels:
treatment-control counties and treatment-control jurisdictions. For the sake of showing the
main results, however, I show the results for counties only.
A key observation is that the license expansion did not immediately lead to entry.
The WLCB would unexpectedly open the application window and it was easy for interested
firms to send an application. The firms’ reasoning for applying was that if there was the
slightest interest in entering the market, it was better to apply while the application window
was open than to wait until the next time it opened. During the last opening, October 2015,
there were no rumors that there was going to be a license expansion. This last application
window closed in March, two months after the measure went into effect.
Getting an application approved is not immediate and the first firms that entered the
market after the reform were those that were approved before the reform was announced.
To account for this timing feature, I will denote as entry due to the reform as any retailer
104
that entered the market after March 2016 to allow some time to pass between the measure
going into effect and firms entering the market. I will treat any firm that entered the market
before March 2016 as a firm that had an application approved before the reform and was
going to enter the market regardless.
One aspect that makes analysis of entry less clean than ideal is that in a substantial
number of markets, the number of allowed licenses was greater than the number of retailers,
which means that the quota was not binding. Figure 2 shows the actual number of active
retailers as time progressed. Note that the total number of active retailers is less than the
total number of available licenses. This translates into natural entry in these unsaturated
markets. However, entry of this kind was occurring both in the treatment and in the control
counties, so the first difference of the difference-in-differences research design should net the
effect of these entries out.
3.4 Data
My main sources of data include cannabis retail sales, inventory transfers between
firms, and laboratory sample potency results from the Washington Liquor and Cannabis
Board.
The main dataset used in this paper is the universe of firm-to-firm inventory transfers
from the WLCB Traceability System for the January 2015-December 2016 period, a total
of 24 months. There is also a scanner dataset of all the final transactions to consumers.
Merging the transfers with the inventory and scanner datasets yields a virtually complete
description of the supply chain in this industry in Washington state. The dispensing data is
used to construct the variables that measure the amounts of inventory sold each month.
The strengths of the dataset are clear, making it ideal to analyze vertical relationships.
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Figure 3.1: Number of Active Retailers in Washington State Over Time
(a) The first line is the date when the reform was announced. The third line is after December
2016, end of the analytical sample.
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One weakness of the dataset is the apparent inability to connect unintegrated producers’
product with retailer sales since these unintegrated producers mostly send their product to
independent processors, who in turn send the processed inventory to retailers. The extra
layer of transfers complicates tracking. The silver lining is that only about 15 percent of
producers are unintegrated with processors and most integrated producers process their own
product 1. I thus focus on integrated producers to avoid the inability to perfectly track the
transfers. I combine the scanner data with inventory transfers to create a log of the inventory
that flows through each retailer in a given month. I construct variables that track the stock
of all products and how the stocks evolve over time as product is sold.
Yakima County serves as a representative example of the apparently exclusive pattern
of inventory transfers between producers and retailers. Figure 2 shows the largest producers
operating in Yakima County on the rows of the tabulation and the retailers, on the columns,
that buy their products. Two retailers are omitted from the table since they were originally
medical retailers and only entered the recreational market at the end of the 24-month period.
The first striking observation from Figure 2 is the large number of producers from all
over the state that operate in a large county with only six retailers. The second observation
is that when producers choose to trade in a county, they tend to trade the majority or
virtually all their inventory with one or two retailers. The pattern becomes less drastic as
the number of retailers in a county increases, as producers have more options to find a buyer.
While the patterns make sense from the standpoint of a retailer, which would want to obtain
products from varied firms, it is worthwhile to find out the motives for producers to engage
with mostly one or two retailers in a given county.
It is important to emphasize the difference in one-off trades versus long-term trades
when classifying by firm-pair/item versus classifying by firm-pair. In Figure 3 (a), when
1Conversations with industry participants appear to confirm the seemingly non-strategic role of processors.
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Figure 3.2: All inventory transfers across time between producers, on rows, and retailers, on
columns, for Yakima County
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only sorting by firm-pair, 28 percent of trades correspond to firm pairs trading once in the
24-month period. While this percentage is still high, most producers engage in some sort of
long-term trading. The caveat, however, is that most of these long-term trades among firm
pairs is composed of myriad different items, in which their prices are individually negotiated
and agreed upon.
The first chart shows the tabulations of trades among firm pairs according to the
number of months in which trading occurs. The second chart shows the tabulations of
trades among firm pairs further classified by item description, according to the number of
months in which trading occurs. In Figure 3 (b), one-off trading, which means a producer
sells a retailer an inventory item once in a 24-month period, accounts for 55 percent of trades.
I conclude that while the bulk of trading is composed of various items being traded once
rather than one popular item being traded every period, most firms engage in some type of
long-term trading.
The following three figures show the evolution of product offerings to retailers. Figure
4 shows how the number of products in the usable category offered by producers. The first
few months do not differentiate between different usable types and in month 7, we see an
average of about 15 usable products per producer. This statistic increases to about 30 by
month 34. Figure 5 shows the evolution of product variety when we include the maximum
number of products offered by producers: we can observe that the producers that offer the
most products increase the number of product offerings over time. This pattern is consistent
with new sizes, new product formats, and novel methods to process usable cannabis. Figure 6
shows the product concentration based on all their product offerings. Market concentration,
when measured by producer, is very low and suggests an unconcentrated market at the
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Figure 3.3: Tabulations of Trade Lengths for Washington State
(a) Trade duration by firm-pair/item (b) Trade duration by firm-pair
upstream level. The first six months look different in the figures because the regulator
labeled all products as ‘Usable’.
3.5 Model
Assume a model where we have the following agents: 1) Consumers in census tract
h, 2) Retailers f , and 3) Producers i.
Producers are assumed to not be strategic agents: they exogenously provide goods
each month. They know their own quality γi. Retailers are assumed to make strategic deci-
sions on which producer to buy from and at what price: retailers’ price-setting assumption
is in line with the fact that retailer entry was heavily restricted, but producer entry was
unrestricted, leading to a substantial degree of buyer power. Consumers visit a nearby store
and purchase a product.
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Figure 3.4: Evolution of products - Product Variety, maximum excluded
Months 1-6: inventory is under one ’product name’, ”Usable”. There is some increase in
the number of products offered over time until it stabilizes. The dots represent the monthly
mean number of products. The lqt2/med2 measure represents the monthly range of products
that lie between the lower interquartile range and the median and the med2/uqt2 measure
represents the monthly range of products that lie between the median and the upperquartile
range. The boundary between the two vertical bars is the median at a given month. This
figure is provided for clarity.
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Figure 3.5: Evolution of products - Product Variety, with maximum included.
Some outlier producers offer more and more products over time. The dots represent the
monthly mean number of products. The lqt2/med2 measure represents the monthly range of
products that lie between the lower interquartile range and the median and the med2/uqt2
measure represents the monthly range of products that lie between the median and the
upperquartile range. The boundary between the two vertical bars is the median at a given
month. This figure, provided for completeness, is less clear than Figure 4 since the maximum
in a given month can be very right-skewed compared to the rest of the distribution for product
variety.
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Figure 3.6: Producers’ products (weight) HHI over time.
Producers, overall, are diversified in their product offerings. The dots represent the monthly
mean number of products. The lqt2/med2 measure represents the monthly range of HHIs
that lie between the lower interquartile range and the median and the med2/uqt2 measure
represents the monthly range of HHIs that lie between the median and the upperquartile
range. The boundary between the two vertical bars is the median HHI at a given month.
The min represents the minimum HHIs.
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3.5.1 Timing
The timing is as follows: First, producers decide which products to offer and the
quality of their products. Second, retailers decide which producers to buy from. Third,
consumers decide which products to buy from the retailer.
At the end of each month, retailers ‘gather’ the signals about products based on
consumer purchases and use this new information for next month’s purchases.
A product j is defined at the producer level ij, but an observation is at the ijft level.
Products are aggregated up to the category level, out of 4 possible categories.
3.5.2 Consumer Demand
Consumers live in the geographic centroid of a census tract z. Based on a radius
X miles away from the centroid, they have a number of retailers as options to purchase
products. Their choice set is Bh = {j ∈ Jf |dhf ≤ rh}, where rh is the maximum distance for
each census tract that guarantees consumers have at least 3 firms to choose from. I assume
consumers know about producers’ brand quality.
Consumers choose a product according to a discrete choice problem:
uzjift = αpjift +Xzjiftβ + ξift + εzjift (3.1)
where ξift = ξi + ξf + ∆ξift.
By specifying the idiosyncratic error term as a TIEV, we can aggregate these utilities






where szjift = szjift|fszft is the choice probability that a consumer in census tract z
chooses product j by producer i at retailer i in month t.
3.5.3 Retailer decision




(pjft − cjft)Qjft (3.3)
Retailers, each month, maximize profits. They have two decisions: first, choose
suppliers and second, set prices.
3.5.4 Price Setting
Given products and competitors, we could model this stage in two different ways. I
assume firms play a Nash-Bertrand game, and we obtain the standard FOCs 2.
3.5.5 Link Formation/Producer Choice
Retailers, each period, choose whether to buy from a certain producer or not. Gener-
ally, a retailer would purchase from a producer again if the product sold well. Note, however,
that it is difficult to break vertical relationships mainly due to the work that comes from set-
ting up the relationship in the first place. This decision to restock from a producer depends
on whether the stock has decreased by a certain amount in a given month. Thankfully, I
observe these inventory flows between producers and suppliers each month.
Thus, the decision for restocking for a retailer can be modeled as a profit maximization
problem where a retailer chooses an optimal bundles of products:
2A different way is to use a rule of thumb as in Escudero (2018) and set a markup of about 50%.
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J∗ft = argmaxJ πft(Xijt, cijt, ξijft,Ht−1) (3.4)
where J∗ft is the optimal bundle of products that retailer f chooses to purchase and
Ht−1 is the history of past purchases.
In summary, the inertia channel is manifested through retailers continuing purchasing
from the same producers regardless of product performance. The ‘consumer demand’ channel
is manifested through retailers responding to what consumers purchased.
3.6 Econometric Model
I do not attempt to directly estimate the model 3. Instead, I search for evidence
of the channels in the link formation stage. I estimate Equation (3.5) with the assembled
dataset. The goal of this exercise is to measure the effect of history Ht−1 on current inventory
decisions versus the effect of consumers demand certain products. We can measure these
effects through a linear probability model:
Tradejift = Xjiftβ + αStockjf + βTradejif(t−1) + γInvSoldjif(t−1) + εjift (3.5)
Where Tradejift denotes whether retailer f buys product j from producer i in month
t, Xjift are product characteristics such as potency, weight, product category, retailer and
retailer zipcode fixed effect, Stockjf is a variable that measures a product j’s performance
at that retailer, Tradejift′ denotes whether the two firms have traded in the near past
4, and
InvSoldjif(t−1) denotes the amount of inventory sold in the last month.
3This could be done in a future iteration of this paper, however, to empirically test competing theories
of learning, understand equilibrium dynamics, or quantify how the process of branding happens.
4I use data going back up to 3 months.
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Stock is defined as the cumulative quantity QT of product ji purchased by retailer
f over time, minus the quantity sold to consumers Qijft. We can define Stock as Stock =
QT−Qijft. The InvSold variable should capture the role of consumer demand and the Trade
variable should capture inertia. A product that gets repurchased regardless of its performance
is attributed to be due to the inertial pull between the existing vertical relationship.
3.6.1 Endogeneity Concerns
It may be difficult to estimate the role of inertia with a dynamic panel model since
the errors may be serially correlated. The main idea behind the identification for this model
is that the amount of product sold yesterday is not correlated of the product purchased
from producers yesterday, as the product sold yesterday was already in stock for periods
before t − 1. In addition, we have retailer entry occurring each month, a product of the
entry process. In the state dependence literature, we generally need some sort of exogenous
variation that can disentangle structural state dependence from unobserved heterogeneity
and this timing assumption appears to provide the required variation.
I argue that the InvSold plays an important role in ameliorating the endogeneity
problem that stems from serial autocorrelation. A retailer may purchase from a producer
simply because they like the producer, and that channel may both appear in the lagged Trade
variable and in the error term. The amount of inventory sold last period helps account for
the unobserved heterogeneity that may be included in the error term 5
3.7 Results
I perform a variety of reduced-form analyses to understand the nature of nascent
vertical relationships. I do so by exploring decisions to purchase from a supplier both at
5If endogeneity is not fully corrected after accounting for lagged inventory sold, one could implement an
Arellano and Bond (1991)-style estimation procedure to make sure the errors are not serially autocorrelated.
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the intensive and extensive margins. I run the analyses through the entire dataset and then
look at several periods of the market’s evolution over time 6. I begin by examining how
the extensive margin. Table (3.6) shows the relationship on whether a retailer purchases
from a producer while measuring the stock based on revenues. Whereas the impact of
the inventory sales variable and the current inventory stock appear to have a null effect
on whether retailer i purchases product from producer j, past purchases appear to have
an impact on present purchases from that producer. Interpreting the coefficients from the
linear probability model, we can conclude that over the entire sample period, purchasing
from a producer yesterday leads to a 23% probability increase of purchasing product from
that producer today, an economically significant amount. The early stages of the market
exhibit greater state dependence and the later stages of the market exhibit little to no state
dependence. The patterns also appear when I look at the role of consumer demand response
and inertia at the extensive margin in table (3.7) when looking at quantities instead of
revenues.
Table 3.2: Empirical Analysis of Vertical Relationships on the Extensive Margin- Revenues
Trade[i=j]t = βTrade[i=j](t−1) + αStock(t−1) + γInvSold(t−1) + δX + εijt (3.6)
Full t<14 t>14 10<t<30 t>27 t<27
β 0.23∗ 0.34∗ 0.082∗ 0.131∗ −0.192∗ 0.12∗
R2 0.38 0.15 0.18 0.22 0.06 0.16
N 55,063 10,873 42,896 33,719 18,663 26,527
γ and α null in all specifications.
*= stat. sig. at 1%
Table (3.8) examines the effects of consumer demand response and inertia at the
intensive margin. The structural state dependence patterns mimic those found with the
6In the results, coefficients not present in a table are economically and statistically insignificant, and are
thus excluded from the tables for clarity.
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Table 3.3: Empirical Analysis of Vertical Relationships on the Extensive Margin- Quantities
Trade[i=j]t = βTrade[i=j](t−1) + αStock(t−1) + γInvSold(t−1) + δX + εijt (3.7)
Full t<14 t>14 10<t<30 t>27 t<27
β 0.23∗ 0.34∗ 0.083∗ 0.13∗ −0.19∗ 0.27∗
R2 0.39 0.15 0.27 0.22 0.19 0.43
N 55,063 10,873 42,896 33,719 18,663 34,098
γ and α null in all specifications.
*= stat. sig. at 1%
extensive margin specification, where I find evidence of substantial structural state depen-
dence at the beginning and little to none toward the end of the sample period. I also find
positive and economically significant estimates for the amount of inventory sold last period,
meaning that retailers respond to consumers purchasing products by buying again from that
producer. These patterns appear mainly toward the end of the sample period. Caution is
recommended for this specification since revenues include both quantities and price, and it is
hard to infer whether these patterns are driven due to prices colliding with quantity-related
sale patterns. To further explore this, table (3.9) examines the role of consumer demand
response and inertia at the intensive margin for quantities alone. The patterns for struc-
tural state dependence and consumer demand response due to inventory sold become more
apparent here. In these last two specifications, greater stock is associated with a negative
likelihood of purchasing from that producer, which is expected due to limited inventory
space.
As an additional check, I look at whether there is evidence of cross-effects: the impact
of past trade at the extensive margin on today’s intensive margin in revenues, shown in Table
(3.10), and in quantities, shown in Table (3.11). The former only appears to show evidence
of existence of consumer demand response at the intensive margin, especially in the later
stages of the market. However, the specifications suggests economically and statistically
insignificant effects for inertia effects and precisely estimated economically small negative
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Table 3.4: Empirical Analysis of Vertical Relationships on the Intensive Margin- Revenues
InvPurch[i=j]t = βInvPurch[i=j](t−1) + αStock(t−1) + γInvSold(t−1) + δX + εijt (3.8)
Full t<14 t>14 10<t<30 t>27 t<27
β 0.15∗ 0.14∗ 0.15∗ −0.0003 −0.10∗ 0.1∗
γ 0.073∗ 0.002 0.03∗ 0.111∗ 0.06∗ 0.073∗
α −0.025∗ 0.014∗ −0.06∗ −0.03∗ −0.2∗ −0.03∗
R2 0.18 0.06 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.13
N 55,063 10,873 42,896 33,719 18,663 26,527
Table 3.5: Empirical Analysis of Vertical Relationships on the Intensive Margin- Quantities
InvPurch[i=j]t = βInvPurch[i=j](t−1) + αStock(t−1) + γInvSold(t−1) + δX + εijt (3.9)
Full t<14 t>14 10<t<30 t>27 t<27
β 0.17∗ 0.48∗ 0.02∗ −0.17∗ 0.16∗ 0.25∗
γ 0.25∗ −0.05 0.28∗ 0.2∗ 0.28∗ 0.12∗
α −0.01∗ −0.08∗ −0.06∗ −0.02∗ −0.16∗ −0.01
R2 0.25 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.01 0.18
N 55,063 10,873 42,896 33,719 18,663 34,098
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effects for stock amounts. The latter shows similar qualitative results, but with more noise
for stock effects and more negative but noisy effects for inertia effects.
Table 3.6: Empirical Analysis of Vertical Relationships of Extensive Margin Variables on
the Intensive Margin- Revenues
InvPurch[i=j]t = βTrade[i=j](t−1) + αStock(t−1) + γInvSold(t−1) + δX + εijt (3.10)
Full t<14 t>14 10<t<30 t>27 t<27
β 148.3 2307.2 -45 -424 -261.1 563.8
γ 0.14∗ 0.05∗ 0.1∗ 0.111∗ 0.01 0.11∗
α −0.02∗ 0.02∗ −0.06∗ −0.03∗ −0.2∗ −0.025∗
R2 0.15 0.08 0.03 0.04 0.03 0.12
N 55,063 10,873 42,896 33,719 18,663 26,527
Table 3.7: Empirical Analysis of Vertical Relationships of Extensive Margin Variables on
the Intensive Margin- Quantities
InvPurch[i=j]t = βTrade[i=j](t−1) + αStock(t−1) + γInvSold(t−1) + δX + εijt (3.11)
Full t<14 t>14 10<t<30 t>27 t<27
β -82.5 -64.1 -37.1 -244.5 -181.2 -13.6
γ 0.42∗ 0.44∗ 0.30∗ 0.37∗ 0.11∗ 0.37∗
α −0.06 0 −0.05 −0.06∗ −0.2∗ −0.002
R2 0.25 0.16 0.15 0.13 0.01 0.18
N 55,063 10,873 42,896 33,719 18,663 34,098
Conversely, I look at whether there is evidence of the opposite cross-effect: the impact
of past inventory purchases (intensive margin) on today’s extensive margin in revenues,
shown in Equation (3.12), and in quantities, shown in Equation (3.13). All coefficients in
these two specifications are noisy null results.
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Trade[i=j]t = βInvPurch[i=j](t−1) + αStock(t−1) + γInvSold(t−1) + δX + εijt (3.12)
Trade[i=j]t = βInvPurch[i=j](t−1) + αStock(t−1) + γInvSold(t−1) + δX + εijt (3.13)
3.8 Discussion
The empirical results in the previous section suggest some interesting implications.
The various specifications show evidence of structural state dependence, suggesting firms
face some difficulty breaking a link with its supplier/buyer and allowing us to dive deeper
into when and to what extent responses to consumer demand and inertia occur. I find that
inertia is mostly present at the beginning of the market and that firms for the most part
respond to consumer demand patterns over time and is mostly present towards the end of the
data sample. This behavior is consistent with the idea of markets reaching an equilibrium
and firms becoming more in tune to their customers while under the presence of frictions.
The empirical analysis also sheds light into the nature of these link formation decisions at
the intensive and extensive margin.
More questions arise from these results: if I can measure consumer learning instead
of response to consumer demand, we could perform some comparative statics on consumer
welfare, retailer profits, and tax revenue under perfect information versus under imperfect
information. From the firm point of view, it may be fruitful to investigate why certain
brands grow and why others do not in a market that begins from day one. Given learning,
the data could be used to test competing theories of firm learning: does learning occur
through consumers or through retailers? Can we learn about the nature of the frictions?
Many avenues of potential research open up from this analysis, especially on questions about
brand building, network formation, and firm behavior on the equilibrium path.
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3.9 Conclusion
In this project I study the role of consumer demand and inertia between retailers and
producers and the incentives behind contract formation in the nascent Washington State
recreational cannabis industry. I use administrative data from the Washington cannabis
regulator to assemble a novel and comprehensive dataset of vertical relationships along the
industry’s supply chain. The estimates indicate that there is substantial structural state
dependence in vertical relationships along the industry’s supply chain, especially at the
beginning of the market, suggesting the existence of long-term contracts. This suggests that
firms are reluctant to sever their existing business links due to poorly performing products
and thus serves as a cautionary tale against making assumptions about firms when not in
equilibrium. However, the inertia effects become muted and insignificant as the market
matures. As the market reaches an equilibrium, product performance becomes the leading
factor for producer-retailer matching, which is expected as retailers become more in tune
about consumers’ preferences. The toy model helps motivate the empirical analysis and to
help rationalize the findings.
These investigations can guide fruitful future research, targeting questions of learn-
ing and how firms reach an equilibrium in the presence of imperfect information. Future
immediate work involves estimating the structural version of the economic model to more
explicitly capture the role of learning and inertia, as well as testing various types of learning.
The findings that arise from this work can help guide modeling assumptions for markets that
are not yet in equilibrium and that share similar market conditions as the one in this case







A.1 Additional Details and Variable Construction
A.1.1 Maximum Simulated Likelihood
I explain how to alternatively estimate location-specific monthly fixed costs through
maximum simulated likelihood. Before specifying the likelihood, I must add additional be-
havioral assumptions to make the game internally consistent. The reason for this is that
the game is complete information and demand across jurisdictions and location sets is in-
terrelated, so I am unable to form a likelihood by assuming each licensed firm’s decision is
independent of the other firms. To bypass this issue and ensure the game stays internally
consistent, I change the subgame perfect equilibrium to a quantal response equilibrium. In
this new setting, all firms receive a logit shock in the location stage, but each firm believes
other firms do not receive the shock: this effectively introduces some bounded rationality in
the game, and allows me to form the likelihood while ensuring firms play a sequential game
that contains an equilibrium.
For a candidate parameter γ, I can approximate the likelihood by simulating location
choices in all location sets using S draws from the joint distribution of unobservable shocks







µ(ŷsm(εsm, γ,O) = ym) (A.1)
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This is the percentage of the S simulated location choices which equate to the location





The parameters γ are found via a nonlinear search.
A.1.2 List of Location Sets
Based on these kinds of boundaries, I tackle the biggest challenge to feasibly estimat-
ing the model: I divide the City of Seattle into 8 location sets of roughly 20 census tracts
each:
1) Northeast (northern city limits, east of I-5, west of Lake Washington, and north
of 75th street),
2) Northwest (northern city limits, west of I-5, east of Elliott Bay, and north of 85th
street),
3)UW/Wallingford/Fremont (south of North 75th street, east of Highway 99, north
of Lake Union, and west of Lake Washington),
4) Ballard/Queen Anne (south of North 85th street, west of Highway 99, north of
Denny Way, and east of Elliott Bay),
5) Downtown/Capitol Hill/Central District (south of Lake Union and south of Denny
Way, north of Yesler Way and north of I-90, bounded between the bays),
6) Docks (between Hwy 509 and I-5, and parts of West Seattle and Mt Baker).
A.1.3 Walk-through of finding the entry game equilibrium
I describe a walk-through of how to find the equilibrium of the application game:
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1) Draw Nm potential firms in a jurisdiction m.
2) If a jurisdiction has more than one location set, assign each potential firm to a
location set in a manner proportional to the location set populations 1.
3) Start with an initial nm applicants. For each of these numbers of potential firms,
compute expected profits conditional on getting a license, E[rf (·)− sf (·)|I] by taking expec-
tations over orderings that will occur in location game. Compute expected profits E[πf |I]
as in equation (1.33).
4) If a jurisdiction has more than one location set: start with a candidate nAjm for
each location set Ajm. Compute step 3 for each element in vector {nAjm}j. The most
populous jurisdictions move first, and within a jurisdiction, the most populous location sets
move first. If a location set has non-negative expected profits, increase nAjm by 1. Repeat
until each location set reaches nAjm such that E[πf (nAjm + 1)|I] < 0.
Step 4) addresses the third point in the previous section: interactions between nAjm ’s
in location sets. I assume that firms in a location set know how many firms will apply in
other location sets and use this information to evaluate whether the cap will bind, and in
turn adjust their decision to apply.
A.1.4 Measuring Welfare
A.1.4.1 Consumer Welfare
In the baseline estimation and in the counterfactuals, I measure consumer welfare
in a familiar fashion to most research that specifies a consumer demand system like Berry,
Levinsohn and Pakes (1995). The differences in consumer welfare will be driven by 1)
differences in prices among retailers and 2) consumer proximity to retailers.
The consumer surplus formula takes the familiar form: CS = 1
α
E[max{Uij}]
1More populated location sets are assigned more potential firms.
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A.1.4.2 Resident Externalities
In this section I explain how I use the reduced-form hedonic regression estimates to
calculate resident welfare in the baseline and in the counterfactuals. My property data has
property values in full, so first I convert them to yearly payoffs to homebuyers. I do this by
equating the value of a house, which can be interpreted as the net present value, to the sum







where r is the annual interest rate, Ft is the annual payoff, and V is the sum of a T-year
discounted sum of flows. The goal in this exercise is to convert the stock into a flow. Once
the property value is decomposed, I calculate the 10-year net present value of the property
to more accurately compare with the 10-year length that retailers are expected to operate.
I make additional assumptions to back out the yearly payoff from the property value
V, which is observed. First, I set r = 0.09, T = 30, and assume Ft increases by 6% annually.
With these values, I can back out F0 for each property.
For each property, I determine 1) whether it is close to a retailer and 2) whether its
assigned school is close to a retailer. If so, I multiply the property’s F0 flow value by the
corresponding reduced-form parameter estimate. Finally, I sum over all affected properties
to obtain the resident welfare value.
Several caveats are in place for this resident welfare calculation. First, the externality
impact is for the average homebuyer, meaning I am not able to break down the externality
for heterogeneous groups of consumers with this approach. An implication of this is that I
will likely measure the impact toward groups that view cannabis retailers as a disamenity,
such as families with children or people with conservative values, and underweigh the impact
for those homebuyers that may have a preference for 1) being near a cannabis retailer and
2) not caring that a retailer is close to their assigned school. Second, I shut off the sorting
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channel: this means that when a counterfactual leads to firms closer to schools, I shut
down the potential effect of residents deciding to sell their homes, which can decrease the
property values even further. Larsen (2020b) develops a model of homebuyer demand and
supply that accounts for 1) heterogeneous homebuyers and 2) equilibrium sorting to more
accurately measure the resident welfare from cannabis retailer location. Third, since the data
only features property sales, the welfare calculations are for homebuyers, not all residents,
meaning it excludes renters. Fourth, it assumes households expect the market to stay the
same in the future when they calculate their expected yearly payoffs from the property. This
assumption could be considered innocuous if we were standing in 2014, where the rules of
the budding market seemed set in stone, but looks less innocuous now that several changes
were enacted such as doubling the number of licenses and relaxing the buffers for some of the
sensitive-use areas. One promising factor supporting this last assumption is that the buffers
for schools stayed the same in the entire state.
A.1.4.3 Tax Revenues
Since each counterfactual can yield potentially different number of licenses, locations,
and retail prices, the final prices that consumers face will be different. We can compute the







where τm is the combination of local and state sales taxes.
The other side of the coin would involve computing the property tax revenues col-
lected. Assume that property taxes are paid once a year and that appraisal (property value
updating) takes place before the tax must be paid. The average levy rate on assessed value
of properties in King County is 0.0925 percent. Most properties’ assessed value and market
129
value tend to be equal. Due to the nature of the limitations on tax rates in the state, each
county has an average effective property tax rate, so measuring how the property tax revenue
changes by counterfactual scenario would involve 1)assessing which properties are affected
by the negative externalities, measure how much value is lost, and measure the difference in






τm(Vi,new − Vi,old) (A.5)
The same caveats from measuring resident externalities apply to the measurement of
changes in property tax revenues.
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